When Employee Taunts Employer via Facebook to "FIRE ME. ...Make my day. . ." NLRB Memo Concludes the Employer Can Go For It

The National Labor Relations Board Office of the General Counsel released an Advice Memorandum in Tasker Healthcare Group, d/b/a Skinsmart Dermatology ("Tasker") Case 04-CA-094222 on May 16, 2013 and concluded that an employee was not engaged in protected concerted activity when she posted comments to a Facebook group message that taunted her employer to "FIRE ME ... Make my day ..."

The Charging Party was employed by Tasker, which was a medical office with approximately nineteen employees. The Charging Employee along with a few current and former employees engaged in a private Facebook group message to organize a social event. The first hour of the exchange was non-eventful and focused on planning the social event. Things soon got interesting when a former employee made a joke. In response, the Charging Party mentioned that a former employee who had previously left was coming back to work and speculated that Tasker may make the returning employee a supervisor. The Charging Party then attacked her current supervisor claiming he "tried to tell [her] something today and [she] said aren't you the supervisor for mind and body ... in other words back the freak off..." But Charging Party was not done there and added, "[Tasker is] full of shit ... They seem to be staying away from me, you know I don't bite my [tongue] anymore, FUCK ... FIRE ME ... MAKE my day ..." Other than Charging Party, no other current employees took part in this portion of the conversation, but one did pipe up after Charging Party complained following a two hour lull that she had been deserted and there was "[n]o one to make [her]laugh." In response, the current employee said she made the Charging Party laugh and added "it's getting bad there [at Tasker], it's just annoying as hell. It's always some dumb shit going on." The Charging Party did not have anything substantive to add to this and no other current employee added anything else work-related.

As you might have guessed, one of the current employees included on the group message who did not say anything during the exchange showed the Facebook posts to the employer. The employer took Charging Party up on her request to be fired stating that it was "obvious" that she was not longer interested in working there, and indeed made her day.

The employee filed a charge alleging that her termination violated the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") because her Facebook comments constituted protected concerted activity. In an Advice Memorandum, the NLRB Office of the General Counsel concluded that the employee's Facebook message did not constitute protected concerted activity because they did not involve shared employee concerns over terms and conditions of employment. To understand this conclusion, it is important to understand the NLRB's test for concerted activity, which is whether the activity is engaged "in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself" and includes circumstances where employees seek to "initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action," and where individual employees bring "truly group complaints" to the employer's attention. However, comments made "solely by and on behalf of the employee himself are not concerted" are not protected and neither is "mere griping" by an employee who does not look forward to any action.

Applying this to the facts at hand, the Advice Memorandum found that the employee's comments merely expressed an "individual gripe rather than any shared concerns about working conditions." Specifically, the employee's comments telling a supervisor to "back the freak off"; stated her employer was "full of shit"; and that her employer should "FIRE ME ... Make my day" reflected individual "griping" and personal contempt rather than shared employee concerns over terms and conditions of employment. In addition, there was no evidence that any of the Charging Party's coworkers interpreted the postings as shared concerns over their working conditions, not even the posting "it's getting bad there[,] it's just annoying as hell" because it was ambiguous and bore no relation to the Charging Party's earlier comments.

Takeaways: This one is a win for employers, but employers are still reminded to be cautious when terminating an employee for the things they say on social media. This case demonstrates that even when an employee's comments on social media are so outrageous that they literally ask the employer to fire the employee, the employer must still do some analysis to determine whether the comments may constitute concerted protected activity under the NLRA. So employers keep the NLRB's standard for concerted protected activity in mind before terminating an employer for social media posts and ask yourself: (1) What was said? (2) Who said it? (3) Who commented on it or chimed in on the conversation? (4) Could it be considered shared employee concerns about terms and conditions of employment?
 

NLRB Issues Third Facebook Firing Decision (Employers 1, Employees 2). Would Bettie Page Roll Over In Her Grave?

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has issued its third Facebook firing decision. In Design Technology Group LLC dba Bettie Page Clothing (Case No. 20-CA-035511, 359 NLRB No. 96), the Board found that the employer, a clothing store, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by discharging three employees for engaging in what the Board deemed protected concerted activity after the employees posted messages on Facebook complaining about their working conditions. The Board also held the store violated the NLRA by maintaining a “Wage and Salary Disclosure” rule in its handbook prohibiting employees from disclosing information about wages or compensation to any third party or other employees.

The employees worked at a retail store in a tourist area in San Francisco. The store closed an hour later than other stores in the area, and employees claimed they felt unsafe leaving when the area was deserted. The employees directed their concerns to the manager, who they claimed did nothing. The employees went over the manager's head to the store owner who said they would close the store earlier. The manager got upset because the employees went around her to the owner and verbal arguments between the manager and employees ensued. So what did the employees do? Well, they did what every 20-something-disgruntled-clothing-store employee does when they are mad — they took to Facebook and posted about the situation to hundreds of their closest “friends.” While some comments were clearly unprotected venting that were not directed specifically to work conditions, e.g., “bettie page would roll over in her grave” and “I’m physically and mentally sickened,” one zinger was a more than a rant: “hey dudes it’s totally cool, tomorrow I’m bringing a California Worker’s Rights book to work. My mom works for a law firm that specializes in labor law and BOY will you be surprised by all the crap that’s going on that’s in violation 8) [sic] see you tomorrow!”

And as many 20-something-clothing-store employees would do, one employee who saw the posts showed them to the owner who subsequently fired the other three employees. One of the terminated employees filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB challenging the termination and the employer’s policy that prohibited employees from discussing their wages and salary.

By now, I think we know how this story ends. The NLRB found the Facebook posts were part of the employees' efforts to get the clothing store to close earlier based on safety concerns and thus, the store committed an unfair labor practice when it fired the employees. Neither the ALJ nor the Board bought the employer’s argument that the posts were an attempt to entrap the employer into firing the employees and were not intended for employees' mutual aid and protection. Going one step further, the NLRB held the posts themselves constituted protected concerted activity under the NLRA. Specifically, the NLRB found: “The Facebook postings were complaints among employees about the conduct of their supervisor as it related to their terms and conditions of employment and about management’s refusal to address the employees’ concerns,” the board's decision said. “Such conversations for mutual aid and protection are classic concerted protected activity, even absent prior action.” The Board ordered the store to reinstate all three employees and to give them back pay. That reunion should be interesting!

Takeaways:

  • This should be old hat by now as it follows the Board’s rulings in Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., case i.e., the “this is your car on drugs” and the Hispanics United of Buffalo Inc. case, i.e., the “a coworker feels that we don’t help our clients enough,” but, nevertheless, here we go again. If an employee complains in any forum about their working conditions, including on social media, those complaints likely are protected and an employer may not take adverse action against the employee for those complaints/posts.
  • Employers cannot issue gag orders and prohibit their non-management employees from talking about their wage and salary information. An employer can argue that this information is confidential, but they will lose this argument in favor of an employee’s rights under the NLRA.

NLRB Issues Advice Memorandum Weighing In On Confidentiality of Employer Investigations

Back in August, we alerted you to an NLRB decision in Banner Health System dba Banner Estrella Medical Center and James A. Navarro, Case No. 28-CA-023438, in which the Board held that an employer’s blanket rule requiring employees to maintain the confidentiality of pending internal company investigations violated the employees’ Section 7 right to discuss discipline or disciplinary investigations involving their fellow employees. At the time, we expressed the concern that the NLRB's position complicates an employer’s ability to protect the integrity of an ongoing investigation. Nevertheless, at the time, we recommended that employers should treat each investigation on an individualized basis and that employers should document its specific business rationale for requesting employee confidentiality during an investigation.

Last week, the NLRB’s Division of Advice issued a Memorandum revisiting this issue. In Verso Paper, NLRB Div. of Advice, No. 30-CA-89350, 1/29/13 [released 4/16/13] Associate General Counsel Barry J. Kearney advised that the employer maintained an overbroad rule requiring employee confidentiality to maintain the integrity of all internal investigations. The company’s Code of Conduct specifically provided:

Verso has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of its investigations. In every investigation, Verso has a strong desire to protect witnesses from harassment, intimidation and retaliation, to keep evidence from being destroyed, to ensure that testimony is not fabricated, and to prevent a cover-up. To assist Verso in achieving these objectives, we must maintain the investigation and our role in it in strict confidence. If we do not maintain such confidentiality, we may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination.

Reviewing this policy, Mr. Kearney reiterated the Board’s position from Banner Health that an employer must show more than a generalized concern with protecting the integrity of its investigations. “Rather, an employer must ‘determine whether in any give[n] investigation witnesses need[ed] protection, evidence [was] in danger of being destroyed, testimony [was] in danger of being fabricated, and there [was] a need to prevent a cover up." Thus, according to Kearney, a blanket rule prohibiting employee discussions of ongoing investigations is unlawful because it does not require the employer first to demonstrate a particularized need for confidentiality in any given situation. He therefore advised the NLRB’s Region 30 Director to issue a complaint against the employer in the absence of settlement.

In a footnote to his Memorandum, Mr. Kearney provided employers with a safe harbor policy that would avoid the potential Section 7 pitfalls. Specifically, he noted that the first two sentences of the employer’s rule lawfully set forth a legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of its investigations and then recommended modifying the remainder of the rule to lawfully advise employees that:

Verso may decide in some circumstances that in order to achieve these objectives, we must maintain the investigation and our role in it in strict confidence. If Verso reasonably imposes such a requirement and we do not maintain such confidentiality, we may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including immediate termination.

It is easy for employers to make any necessary changes to its policies. In addition, there is not a lot of gray area in the Board’s position as there was with respect to social media policies. Therefore, it is unlikely that we will see any actual litigation arising out of the Verso complaint if it gets issued or regarding any other similar company policies. As we previously pointed out, however, it is hard to imagine many, if any, internal investigations that could not be thwarted by the loose lips of co-workers. As a result, I expect that the next significant clash on this issue that goes before the Board will address actual employee discipline cases. When that happens, we will see how far the Board is willing to go to protect employees who interfere with their employer’s internal investigations.
 

NLRB Further Restricts Employer Policies on Employee Communication: NLRB Finds Rules Restricting Employee Communication with Media and Law Enforcement and Communication about Confidential Information Unlawful

On the heels of three memoranda from its General Counsel, multiple ALJ decisions, and even one or two decisions of the full Board addressing employer social media and communications policies over the last couple of years, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)’s decision last week in DirecTV, which held that DirectTV's policies restricting certain employee communication were unlawfully overbroad, might be viewed by some as rather predictable. Nevertheless, despite the uncertain validity of recent Board decisions in general in light of the D.C. Circuit's Noel Canning decision (see our blog post from yesterday for more discussion of the Noel Canning decision), DirecTV is instructive precisely because of its apparent routine nature. In short, as Board decisions related to social media and employee communications become more predictable and routine, the more the employer community has some reasonable assurance that it can craft policies that can withstand NLRB scrutiny.

Communication with the Media:

DirecTV had two policies relating to communications with media that were challenged in this case. The first, a handbook policy, said, simply, “Do not contact the media.” The NLRB said that this policy violated employee rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because it covered employee comments to reporters about labor disputes. The Board did offer some guidance about what might be required of a permissible policy, finding that the rule should have differentiated between protected (by Section 7) statements and non-protected statements, like those that are maliciously false.

The second media communication policy, a “Public Relations” policy on the company intranet, said, in part, “Employees should not contact or comment to any media about the company unless pre-authorized by Public Relations.” The Board struck down this policy as well, holding that it would prevent workers from expressing disagreement with DirecTV to the media about labor disputes, including those about wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment. These rights are protected by Section 7 of the NLRA. The Board noted that the rule made no attempt to limit its application to statements about proprietary information, which presumably would have been permissible.

Communication with Law Enforcement:

The same handbook policy on media communication also addressed communication with law enforcement. The policy stated that if law enforcement “wants to interview or obtain information regarding a DIRECTV employee . . . the employee should contact the Security department” who would handle the inquiry. The Board held that this policy would reasonably be understood by employees to require them to contact security before cooperating in an NLRB investigation of an unfair labor practice charge—even though the NLRA protects employees’ rights to file an unfair labor practice charge and provide information to the NLRB in an unfair labor practice investigation. The Board also found that it was overbroad to the extent it affected employee contact with other law enforcement officials concerning wages, hours, or working conditions. While the Board did not give examples, this would include communications with the Department of Labor, Ohio Bureau of Wage & Hour Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), or Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.

Confidentiality:

The NLRB similarly struck down a handbook policy that said that employees should “[n]ever discuss details about [their] job, company business or work projects with anyone outside the company” and “[n]ever give out information about customers or DIRECTV employees.” Employee records were expressly included as confidential company information. The Board held that this policy would lead employees to believe that they were restricted in discussing wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment—again, something Section 7 protects—and restricted in communicating with union representatives, Board agents, and other governmental agencies about workplace matters—which is also protected by the NLRA.

“Company Information”:

Finally, the Board struck down an intranet policy that prohibited employees from blogging, entering chat rooms, posting messages on public websites, or otherwise disclosing non-public company information. No definition of “company information” was given. “The Board read the previous confidential information policy in conjunction with this policy to conclude that it included discussion of employee records. The Board held that “company information” reasonably could be interpreted to include wages and other information about terms and conditions of employment, which, as mentioned above, cannot be restricted.

Attempted Repudiation of the Unlawful Rules:

During the challenge of these policies, DirecTV rescinded the policies to avoid an unfair labor practice finding. For a repudiation to be a successful defense, it must be timely, unambiguous, specific in nature to the coercive conduct, and untainted by other unlawful conduct. It must also be publicized to employees that going forward, Section 7 rights will not be interfered with. The Board held that DirecTV failed to timely repudiate the policies because the attempted repudiation occurred one year after the rules were put in place and only after a complaint was filed. The Board also found the repudiation ineffective because DirecTV failed to admit wrongdoing, instead publishing the repudiation as an attempt to “clarify” its intent behind the policies.

DirecTV was ordered to rescind the policies and inform employees company-wide that the policies had been revised or rescinded.

Bottom Line: At this point, employers must understand that any social media or similar communications policies that can be interpreted as restricting employees’ rights to communicate with each other or the outside world regarding the terms and conditions of their employment will be struck down by the NLRB. As we have indicated in the past, employers are encouraged to narrowly tailor their policies or provide examples to make it clear that the policies do not have such unlawful objectives.
 

Jamie LaPlante

Remember When "Recess" Meant Fun and Games? The Impact of Canning v. NLRB, and What Employers Need to Know While We Wait and See if the Decision Will Remain In Tact

As the D.C. District Court's long-awaited decision in Noel Canning v. NLRB, invalidating President Obama's January 2012 "recess" appointments, likely heads to the United States Supreme Court, here's what employers need to know in the interim about the impact of that decision.

The Background

As we explained in our post, President Obama's Move to Sidestep the Senate with Recess Appointments, when the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") normal five-person membership fell to two in late 2011 when Craig Becker's (who had also been an Obama recess appointee) appointment expired and the agency, therefore, lost its statutory authority to issue rulings, President Obama made three appointments in early 2012 as the Senate was scheduled to leave on holiday break, which sparked a host of controversy.

The controversial appointments included the appointment of Democrat Sharon Black, a Labor Department Official; Democrat Richard Griffin, General Counsel for the International Union of Operating Engineers; and Republican Terrance Flynn, an NLRB attorney.

Setting the Stage for a One-To-Watch Decision

So why the controversy? Well, President Obama made the appointments while the Republican Senate was holding pro forma sessions over the holiday to technically avoid going into recess. While this tactic was certainly not a new one, as it had been used by other Congresses to avoid triggering the president's recess appointment power, President Obama's move was particularly aggressive because the Senate was meeting every three days with the specific purposes of staying in session and denying him the chance to make recess appointments. With the standoff, President Obama called the Senate's bluff and seated all NLRB nominees.

The recess appointment issue is the focus of over a dozen lawsuits, many of which remain pending, but the lead case — the one to watch — has always been Noel Canning v NLRB pending in the D.C. District Court, which we first introduced you to back in March 2012 in A New Challenge to President Obama's Recess Appointments in Federal Court Means a Decision on the Constitutionality of the Appointments is Getting Closer. The attention certainly is warranted, but not because of the underlying facts, which concern a run-of-the-mill, routine labor dispute. Where it gets interesting is that the decision was decided by three of the five NLRB members, two of whom were "recess" appointees. The case was appealed to the D.C. District Court and the issue to be decided was whether the three-person decision had the necessary quorum of at least three members to be valid. Because the three temporary appointees, were arguably, not legally appointed, the decision was subject to nullification.

The challenge was based on the United States Supreme Court's 2010 case New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB where it held that the five-member NLRB could not delegate its authority to fewer than three members. Thus, a two-person board is not a quorum and is powerless to render decisions. Since Wilma Leibman's term expired in August 2011, the NLRB had been functioning as a three-member unit. The NLRB lost that three-person quorum when Becker's term expired at the end of 2011. When President Obama made the three "recess" appointments, the NLRB only had two members. Therefore, if the President's three "recess" appointments were unconstitutional, arguably every decision made by the NLRB with the recess appointments sitting as quorum effectively would be moot.

The D.C. District Court's Decision

The D.C. District Court issued a two-part decision and held that President Obama's "recess" appointments in January 2012 were constitutionally impermissible.

Part One: The appointments were "made when the Senate was not in Recess" because the President's recess appointment power does not apply to "intrasession" appointments, only "intersession" appointments.

The first part of the court's ruling was unanimous and answered the question: "How long must the Senate be away to technically be on 'recess'"? Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution gives the President the "[p]ower to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate," and these recess appointments do not have to be filled by the Senate. The Constitution does not specify how long the Senate had to be in recess to trigger the President's appointment power so the court answered it, and held that the constitutional authority to fill a vacancy can only be used when one Congress has ended and before a new Congress comes to town, and not during a break between two sessions of the same Congress. Therefore, the President's recess appointment powers do not apply to "intrasession" appointments i.e., those made when Congress has left town for a few days or weeks.

The court's opinion affirmed the "original meaning" mode of interpreting the Constitution, meaning the judges reviewed the constitutional issue by looking at what the framers meant by the words when they originally wrote them. The D.C. District Court reviewed the history of the Recess Appointment Clause, and concluded that "Recess" referred to intersession recesses and not the generally shorter intrasession ones and found:

We hold that "the Recess" is limited to intersession recesses. The Board conceded at oral argument that the appointments at issue were not made during the intersession recess: the President made his three appointments to the Board on January 4, 2012, after Congress began a new session on January 3 and while that new session continued. Considering the test, history and structure of the Constitution, these appointments were invalid from their inceptions. Because the Board lacked a quorum of three members when it issued its decision in this case on February 8, 2012, its decision must be vacated.

The court found that to interpret "the Recess" to include other breaks in Senate business would give the President "free rein" to make appointments "at any time he pleases, whether that time be a weekend, lunch or even when the Senate is in session and he is merely displeased with its inaction." Thus, the judges made a bright-line decision in holding that the Senate only recesses, for purposes of the President's recess appointment power, at the end of the year.

Part Two: The president may only use the recess appointment power to fill "vacancies" that occur during the recess, not those that just happen to exist during the recess.

Two of the three judges went on to address the second issue raised, whether the vacancies filled by the appointments occurred during the Recess. (Judge Thomas B. Griffith determined it was unnecessary to decide the second issue and did not join the opinion.) The employer argued that in order for the President to be able to use the recess appointment power to fill a vacancy, the vacancy must have occurred during an intersession recess. On the other hand, the NLRB argued that the President could fill vacancies that "happen to exist" during the recess, not merely those that arise during the Recess. There was no dispute that the appointments in question did not arise during an intersession recess, and the court invalided them.

Again, the court took a close look at the words used in the Recess Appointments Clause, particularly the phrase "happen to exist" and sided with the employer:

The power of a written constitution lies in its words. It is those words that were adopted by the people. When those words speak clearly, it is not up to us to depart from their meaning in favor of our own concept of efficiency, convenience, or facilitation of the functions of government. In light of the extensive evidence that the original public meaning of "happen" was "arise," we hold that the President may only make recess appointments to fill vacancies that arise during the recess.

The Impact and Your Most Pressing Questions Answered

Noel Canning is likely to go up to the Supreme Court because it concerns the balance of power between the president and the Senate, and therefore far-reaching constitutional implications of authority between the legislative and executive branches, that stretch far beyond just the NLRB. It also speaks to the President's recess appointment power and extends to all federal agencies whose offices are nominated by the President and require Senate approval. This includes federal judges and former Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray's appointment as head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which was made the same day as other "recess" appointments to the NLRB.

What Does This Mean For the NLRB Decisions Issued in 2012? Since the various appeals courts are not bound to adopt each other's opinions, the impact will depend on where the NLRB's decisions are being challenged and how those courts rule. The thing to keep in mind about the D.C. District Court is that it is the one jurisdiction where NLRB decisions can always be appealed, regardless of where the case originated. This is why Noel Canning was the one, out of the dozens case filed, to watch. As such, a party looking to challenge an NLRB decision will likely file it in the D.C. District Court where Noel Canning is binding. Because the decision came out of the D.C. Distrcit Court, the Justice Department has little choice but to seek further review either by filing a petition for en banc review and/or by seeking U.S. Supreme Court review. This course seems likely given the statement NLRB Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce issued after the decision that indicates that the NLRB will seek review: 

The Board respectfully disagrees with today’s decision and believes that the President’s position in the matter will ultimately be upheld. It should be noted that this order applies to only one specific case, Noel Canning, and that similar questions have been raised in more than a dozen cases pending in other courts of appeals.

If the case goes to the Supreme Court, the ruling would determine the validity of all NLRB decisions since Obama made his appointments in January 2012. During the time in question, the NLRB has issued just over 200 Published Orders, which is significantly fewer than during the non-quorum period of 2008-2010 that New Process Steel invalidated. On the other hand, most of the Board's decisions during this period have been decided against employers and some have been very high profile, including Costco Wholesale Corp. where the NLRB struck down the employer's social media policies, and Banner Health System, where the NLRB held that by asking an employee who was the subject of an internal investigation to refrain from discussing the matter while the employer conducted the investigation violated the National Labor Relations Act.

What Does This Mean While We Wait? Subject to the outcome of a possible en banc review and/or a review by the United States Supreme Court, the impact could be quite extensive. The three-seat NLRB is essentially powerless because it cannot function without a quorum. The NLRB currently has only three members, Chairman Pearce and members Block and Griffin, who were among the now-nullified "recess" appointments. The D.C. District Court already has begun issuing orders holding in abeyance the other cases pending there that raise the recess appointment issue. The other dozen or so cases that were appealed in other circuits likely will go through decision in those circuits, which might create a split. Decisions issued by the nullified NLRB that have not yet been appealed, will likely be filed in the D.C. District Court to take advantage of Noel Canning — though, any new appeal will likely be held in abeyance like the court's current appeals.

For those cases that are in compliance with a NLRB decision and that did not appeal the NLRB decision, it is unclear. A party might stop the compliance process and either seek to appeal or wait on the NLRB to try to enforce compliance and rely on Canning to bar enforcement. Cases that have completed compliance and have been closed will be difficult to resurrect.

What If the Supreme Court Affirms? For the answer to this question, we go back to 2010 and New Process Steel. If the Supreme Court affirms Noel Canning, it would mean all the NLRB's decision since January 4, 2012 are invalid, they will be nullified for lack of quorum, and every court will have to recognize the ruling. This will likely mean that the NLRB's decisions since that date will have to be recalled and re-decided by the NLRB.

While the NLRB recovered from New Process Steel fairly easily, given the current political climate, it may not be so easy for the NLRB if Noel Canning is upheld. After New Process Steel, the NLRB obtained a quorum rather easily and rubber-stamped many of the disputed Orders quickly and with the same results. Given the judicial gridlock now, Chairman Pearce would be the only legitimate NLRB member should the "recess" appointments be invalidated by the Supreme Court. His term, however, ends August 27, 2013, well before the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to decide the issue. Because the NLRB will not likely be able to obtain a quick quorum to remand cases, like it did in New Process Steel, and because Congress will not likely "recess" any time soon, it is unlikely that the President will be able to make recess appointments to the NLRB, meaning the agency has little ability to act.

The ruling may also have a deeper impact because those decisions and rules involving Becker, who also was an intrasession recess appointment by President Obama, may be deemed invalid. If Noel Canning remains intact, arguably any decision in which Becker was one of the three members may be subject to challenge as well, because the NLRB may have lost its quorum when former Chair Leibman left on August 27, 2011.

The opposite effect would occur if the Supreme Court overturns Noel Canning: The NLRB's decisions would stand and the members appointed during the Senate break could continue to serve.

I won't go so far to say that this is the most anticipated and far-reaching case of 2013, but I will say that the Supreme Court's opinion on this case will be. Stay tuned.
 

Sara Hutchins Jodka

There's No "I" In At-Will Disclaimers: NLRB Acting General Counsel Advises on Two At-Will Disclaimers and Gives Employers a Halloween Treat

Just when employers were thinking they might have to throw out their at-will disclaimers, the National Labor Relations Board Acting General Counsel released an analysis of two at-will employment clauses (Mimi's Café, Case Number 28-CA-0844365 and Rocha Transportation, Case No. 32-CA-086799), and in finding both lawful under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), gave employers a Halloween treat!

The first at-will disclaimer analyzed was contained in Mimi's Café's handbook (a company acquired by Bob Evans Farms, Inc. in 2004), that provided:

AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
The relationship between you and Mimi's Café is referred to as "employment at will." This means that your employment can be terminated at any time for any reason, with or without cause, with or without notice, by you or the Company. No representative of the Company has authority to enter into any agreement contrary to the foregoing "employment at will" relationship. Nothing contained in this handbook creates an express or implied contract of employment.

The second challenged at-will provision was in Rocha Transportation's Handbook that provided:

Statement of At-Will Employment Status
Employment with Rocha Transportation is employment at-will. Employment at-will may be terminated with or without cause and with or without notice at any time by the employee or the Company. Nothing in this Handbook or in any document or statement shall limit the right to terminate employment at-will. No manager, supervisor, or employee of Rocha Transportation has any authority to enter into an agreement for employment for any specified period of time or to make an agreement for employment other than at-will. Only the president of the Company has the authority to make any such agreement and then only in writing.

This Handbook also contained an "Acknowledgment of Receipt" employees were required to sign that noted "nothing in the employee handbook creates or is intended to create a promise, contract, or representation of continued employment ..."

The bolded provisions were challenged as violating Section (a)(1) of the NLRA because they were allegedly overly broad and would reasonably chill employees from exercising their Section 7 rights to select union representation and engage in collective bargaining.

Using essentially the same analysis to analyze both provisions, the General Counsel concluded that the contested provisions could not reasonably be interpreted to restrict an employee's Section 7 right to engage in concerted attempts to change his or her employment-at-will status because they did not require employees to refrain from seeking to change their at-will status or agree that their at-will status could not be changed in any way. Rather, they merely provided that the company's agents were not authorized to modify an employee's at-will status.

With respect to the Mimi's Café provision, the General Counsel focused on the last sentence, "[n]othing contained in this handbook creates an express or implied contract of employment," to conclude that the purpose of the at-will policy was to defend against potential legal actions by employees asserting that the handbook created an enforceable contract of employment, rather than violate an employee's Section 7 rights.

As for Rocha Transportation's policy, the General Counsel concluded that the challenged provision expressly permitted an employee's at-will status to be modified, even if it could only be done by the Company's president. This "possibility of a potential modification of the at-will relationship through a collective-bargaining agreement" ratified the Company president was sufficient to save the policy from being struck down.

With this, the General Counsel recommended The Region dismiss its challenges after concluding that no reasonable employee would construe either provision to restrict their Section 7 right to select a collective-bargaining representative and bargain collectively for a contract when considered in context.

The General Counsel distinguished both conclusions from the Red Cross Arizona Blood Services Region decision in which an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining the following language in an at-will employment acknowledgment: "I further agree that the at-will employment relationship cannot be amended, modified or altered in any way." In that decision, it was the use of the word "I", whereby the employees specifically agreed that their at-will agreement could not be changed in any way, which constitutes a "waiver" of their right "to advocate concertedly ... to change his/her at-will status," that was problematic. Thus, the provision in Red Cross more clearly involved a waiver of Section 7 rights compared to Mimi's Café's at-will provision.

Takeaways: It appears that the General Counsel has decided to take a more relaxed view of at-will disclaimers by distinguishing Red Cross. Employers, however, should review their employment-at-will disclaimers and keep the following in mind:

  • At-Will Disclaimers Should Defend Against Potential Legal Actions That the Handbook Created a Contract: To the extent an at-will disclaimer includes language that nothing in the handbook is intended to create a contract, promise or representation of employment, it looks like it will be upheld so long as the overall purpose of the at-will policy can be interpreted to defend against potential legal actions by employees asserting that the handbook created an enforceable contract of employment, rather than violate an employee's Section 7 rights.
  • Ensure the At-Will Relationship is Modifiable: If the at-will disclaimer is modifiable in any way, even if only one particular person, it will likely pass muster – just keep the word "I" out of it (see below). 
  • There's No "I" In At-Will Disclaimers: An at-will employment acknowledgment or disclaimer that uses the personal pronoun "I" to signify that the employee specifically agrees their at-will employment cannot be modified will be unlawful.

The parties in both cases settled before the Board could review the ALJ's decisions. Thus, the law on this issue remains unsettled. As such, the Acting General Counsel asked the Regional Offices to submit cases involving employer handbook at-will provisions to the Division of Advice for further analysis and coordination. So, stayed tuned as there is certainly much more we can expect on this issue.

One Day You're In, the Next You're Out: A Policy-by-Policy Analysis of the Fallout for Employer Policies in the Wake of the NLRB's Decisions in Costco and EchoStar

Following closely after the NLRB's first social media decision in Costco Wholesale Corporation (NLRB Case No. 34-CA-012421) just weeks ago, an ALJ for the Board has issued a mammoth 43 page decision in EchoStar Technologies (NLRB Case No. 27-CA-066726) striking down numerous employer policies that in his opinion unlawfully chilled employees' rights to engage in protected concerted activity.

This post takes a look at the policies challenged in the EchoStar decision and summarizes where employers stand now.

To understand the NLRB's recent decision in EchoStar, it is important to first understand where the NLRB is coming from. When reviewing employer policies, whether they be social media related or not, the Board and its ALJs focus on whether the challenged policy would reasonably tend to "chill" employees in their Section 7 rights, which include the right to discuss and complain about their issues such as wages, hours, and working conditions with other employees and to disclose, discuss and complain about those matters to labor organizations and to the public. Whether a particular employer policy would "reasonably tend to chill employees" in their exercise of their Section 7 rights is judged objectively by whether it is likely to have a chilling effect on Section 7 rights, even if the employer has never even enforced the policy.

Keeping this background in mind, let's go through each of the employer policies that were at issue in EchoStar to see where the ALJ came out and why.

Challenged Policy No. 1 - Non-Disparagement and Non-Defamation Policy

You may not make disparaging or defamatory comments about EchoStar, its employees, officers, directors, vendors, customers, partners, affiliates, or our, or their, products/services.  Remember to use good judgment.

 

EchoStar: Unlawful.  The ALJ found that a reasonable employee would read the prohibited action "disparaging" to intrude on protected conduct and struck down the policy in full. In essence, the ALJ accepted the NLRB General Counsel's argument that handbook’s “blanket” prohibition of employee “disparaging comments” … “fails to make exception for statements and comments that, although critical or harsh, may enjoy the ’[NLRA]’s protection”. This is consistent with the Costco decision where the Board struck down a broad prohibition against making statements that “damage the Company, defame any individual or damage any person’s reputation”. The ALJ, however, expressed that a policy could prohibit "malicious gossip" or "malicious statements."

Challenged Policy No. 2 - Use of Social Media on Company Equipment or Company Time

Unless you are specifically authorized to do so, you may not: Participate in these activities [social media] with EchoStar resources and/or on Company time.

 

EchoStar: Unlawful. Although the ALJ did not detail his reasons for striking down this policy, the General Counsel argued that the Handbook did not define what was considered "Company time" as opposed to "working time and there was no indication that any lawful limits were ever communicated to employees. Taking this cue, had the policy prohibited employees from engaging in social media activities during "working time" and narrowly defined working time in the context of their employment with EchoStar, the policy might have survived the ALJ's scrutiny.
 

Challenged Policy No. 3 – Employee Contact with the Media

The policy at issue required employees to do the following:

  • Receive prior authorization to correspond, with members of the media or press regarding the Company or its business activities;
  • Direct inquiries to the Company's communications department;
  • Obtain written authorization from Company's communications department before engaging in public communication regarding the Company or its business activities;
  • The following conduct was prohibited:
    • All public communications, including contact with media and members of the press, including print, broadcast and their electronic versions and associated websites and blogs.
    • Presentations, speeches or appearances, including conference, seminars, company publications, advertising, video releases, opinion articles, advertisements, etc., regarding the Company by the Company's business partners or any third parties including consultants.

 

EchoStar: Unlawful. The ALJ reviewed the policy as a whole, found that a reasonable employee reading it would not read it as limiting only official employee contact with the media to those employees with authority to do so, and struck down the entire policy. Given the way the ALJ structured his conclusion, it would appear that a stark prohibition of communication with the media by employees would be deemed impermissible. It would not be impermissible, however, to prohibit employees from speaking on behalf of the Company without first obtaining authority prior to the employee's purported official conduct. Because the policy as written confused to the two distinctions, the ALJ struck it down.

 

Challenged Policy No. 4 – Employee Discussions Regarding Confidential Information

 

... You must not discuss it with or disclose it to outsiders without the prior written authorization of duly authorized Company personnel, both during and after employment with the Company.  Similarly, you are responsible for the internal security of confidential information; you must not discuss it with or disclose it to another employee unless he or she has a specific need to know and only when you are authorized to discuss or disclose it....

 

 

EchoStar: Lawful. The General Counsel took issue with this policy because it included "employee information" in the list of proprietary information EchoStar considered confidential and subject to the policy. The NLRB reviewed the challenged portion of the policy within the context of the policy as a whole, which used the phrase in a larger definition of "confidential information", which also included trade secrets, satellite technology, customer lists, vendor lists, pricing lists, computer systems technology, sales and profit data, and strategic business plans". Relying on another case that had used the term "employer information" among a list of things that constituted confidential intellectual property where the policy was upheld, the ALJ concluded that a reasonable employee would reasonably understand that the policy was designed to protect the confidentiality of the Company's proprietary business information rather than to prohibit discussion of employee wages or other topics protected under Section 7.

 

Challenged Policy No. 5 – Employee Contact with Government Agencies

 

The [Company's] General Counsel must be notified immediately of any communication involving federal, state or local agencies that contact any employee concerning the Company and/or relating to matters outside the scope of normal job duties....Do not engage in any further discussion.  An employee cannot be required to provide information, and any response may be forthcoming after the General County has reviewed the situation.

 

 

EchoStar: Lawful. The General Counsel argued that the policy limits an employee's ability to participate in the Board's processes and would also be read to limit an employee's ability to concertedly seek the assistance of other government agencies to improve working conditions and that employees are not at liberty to independently discuss the Company or its business with any government agent. The ALJ disagreed and found that the rule made it obvious to a reasonable employee that the limitations apply only to official contacts directed to the Company and not to the employee as an individual with individual information or questions.

 

Challenged Policy No. 6 – Employer's Right to Request that Investigations Remain Confidential

 

[With respect to Company investigations] ... You are also expected to maintain confidentiality....

 

EchoStar: Unlawful. Here, the General Counsel argued that the confidentiality policy contained no limiting language and appeared to apply to all investigations and to all employees, whether the employee herself was under investigation, cooperating with the investigation, or merely became aware of the investigation. The General Counsel also took issue with the lack of any temporal restriction in the policy, which could mean the policy applied equally to ongoing and closed investigations.

Although the Company argued that employers need confidentiality in their investigation to be able to conduct a fair and unbiased investigation into matters, the ALJ concluded that the need for confidentiality needed to be determined on a case by case basis after balancing the need for confidentiality against the employees' rights to discuss terms and conditions of employment. Relevant factors according to the ALJ included, 
 

"whether in any given investigation witnesses need protection, evidence is in danger of being destroyed, testimony is in danger of being fabricated, and there is a need to prevent a cover up. Only if the [Company] determines that such a corruption of its investigation would likely occur without confidentiality is the [Company] then free to prohibit its employees from discussing these matters among themselves."
 

 

Challenged Policy No. 7 – Disciplinary Actions

Not unlike many employers, EchoStar included in its Handbook, a list of examples of conduct that were unacceptable and subject to disciplinary action including, among many other things like possessing, distributions, sale or use of illegal drugs on Company premises:

Insubordination (The refusal to follow a reasonable work directive or undermining the Company, management or employees).

 

EchoStar: Unlawful. The problem in this rule was one not with the inclusion of "insubordination" as grounds for termination; the problem was with the parenthetical that followed, specifically the "undermining" part. The General Counsel argued that this statement was vague and might include conduct that employee might engage in to improve their working conditions, but that have the effect of undermining the Company's interest, e.g., striking, picketing, etc. The ALJ agreed and struck down the policy on what appears to be based the use of the phrase "undermining the Company, management or employees." Had EchoStar not included the parenthetical, specifically the "undermining part, the policy likely would have survived the Board's scrutiny.

Savings Clauses

 

"Should you have questions about the Handbook, please contact the Human Resources Department."

 

“One or more of the policies set forth in this Handbook may be affected by the application of law.  Should a conflict arise between an EchoStar policy and the law, the appropriate law shall be applied and interpreted so as to make the policy lawful in that particular jurisdiction.”

EchoStar: Ineffective. The ALJ held that the Company's savings clauses did not in fact "save" " any of the policies he concluded to be unlawful, stating (1) the employee should not be required to "voice his or her fears and trepidations" to human resources if they have questions about a policy's possible reach and (2) a general clause asserting that a policy should be applied and interpreted does not "save" an otherwise invalid rule.

So, for those of you keeping score, 5 of the 7 policies challenged in the EchoStar case were found unlawful and the Savings Clause struck down. For those who like charts like I do, here is what survived under both EchoStar and Costco, which we reported on here, and what did not:

 

Lawful

Unlawful

Social Media Policies

Prohibiting employees from spreading "malicious gossip" and/or making "malicious statements", which can further be defined as with the "intention or desire to harm another usually seriously, through doing something unlawful or otherwise unjustified; willfulness in the commission of a wrong; evil intention".  EchoStar.

Prohibiting employees from making "disparaging" or "derogatory" statements about others.  EchoStar.

Requiring employees communicating by e-mail, the Internet, or other technology or electronic means to do so “with appropriate business decorum.”  Costco.

Prohibiting employees from making statements that damage the company’s or any person's reputation, or defame any individual.  Costco.

Communicating with Company Equipment

Restricting social media activities with Company resources to "working time," as more specifically defined.  EchoStar.

Restricting social media activities with Company resources to "Company time".  EchoStar.

Communication with the Media

Prohibiting employees from speaking on the Company's behalf without first obtaining authority.  EchoStar.

Prohibiting employee from communicating with the media by employees.  EchoStar.

Confidential Information

Prohibiting employees from disclosing or discussing "employee information" that is included in a list of other confidential/proprietary information that would not be interpreted to prohibit an employee from discussing wages, hours and working conditions.  EchoStar.

Prohibiting employees from disclosing or discussing "employee information" that is in isolation and not included in a list of other confidential/proprietary information that would not be interpreted to prohibit an employee from discussing wages, hours and working conditions.  EchoStar.

Contact with Government Agencies

Prohibiting or directing how an employee corresponds with a government agency with respect to official contacts directed to the Company.  EchoStar.

Prohibiting employees from corresponding with a government agency outside the employee's official capacity for the Company.  EchoStar.

Confidentiality During Investigations

Requesting employees to keep the contents of an investigation confidential because of a need for protection, e.g., evidence in danger of being destroyed, testimony in danger of being fabricated, a need to prevent a cover up.   EchoStar.

Issuing a blanket policy demanding confidentiality in investigations.  EchoStar.

Disciplinary Actions

Including "insubordination" as grounds for discipline.  EchoStar.

Including "undermining " behavior as grounds for discipline.  EchoStar.

 

First NLRB Decision on Employer Social Media Policies

Employers adopting social media policies have to consider whether they would be struck down by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) if challenged as invalid under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. Section 7 protects the rights of union, as well as non-union, employees to communicate at or away from work about terms and conditions of employment. Citing a desire to provide guidance to employers regarding workplace regulation of employee use of social media, the chief lawyer for the NLRB (its “General Counsel”) issued guidance reports in August 2011, January 2012 and May 2012 to show what sorts of social media policies the General Counsel believes violate Section 7. The NLRB considers but is not bound by the General Counsel’s guidance when issuing decisions. Until recently, the NLRB itself had not had occasion to issue a decision on a social media policy.

In Costco Wholesale Corporation (NLRB Case No. 34-CA-012421), the NLRB considered a social media policy for the first time. The NLRB invalidated portions of Costco’s policies and in doing so signaled that it will probably track closely with the General Counsel’s guidance when reviewing social media policies. That means a very aggressive review and the likelihood that policies which are not drafted narrowly and carefully will be struck down.

Reviewing an unfair labor practice charge filed by the United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union challenging various Costco employee handbook policies, the NLRB considered the following two policies which relate to social media use:

  • A policy requiring that all employees communicating by e-mail, the Internet, or other technology or electronic means must do so “with appropriate business decorum.”
  • A policy banning electronic communication, including on message boards and other social media, which damage the company’s or any person's reputation, or defame any individual.

The NLRB upheld the “decorum” requirement, although the decision does not include any specific analysis to indicate why. The NLRB struck down the rule which threatened discipline for communication which might damage the reputations of the company or any person or which defamed any individual. The NLRB held that an employee could “reasonably construe [the policy] as one that prohibits Section 7 activity” and that it “would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.” The Board held that the broad prohibitions in the rule against making statements that damage the Company, defame any individual or damage any person’s reputation could include communications by employees complaining about working conditions. The decision is consistent with the general idea advanced by the General Counsel in guidance that broad restrictions on negative statements may make employees feel that they are prohibited from complaining in social media about working conditions.

Notably, the NLRB criticized the fact that the Costco policy did not include any language excluding communications protected under the NLRA from the restrictions of the rule. That suggests that if the rule had expressly excluded Section 7-like communication from the scope of the rule, it might have survived. In the guidance memos, the General Counsel has said that disclaimer clauses like this would not be effective to cure a policy which otherwise violates Section 7 rights. So it remains to be seen whether disclaimer language will be considered important in future NLRB decisions. Employers drafting social media policies will have to decide whether to include a Section 7 disclaimer in light of the fact that spelling out Section 7 rights as an exclusion may simply provide a road map to the workforce advertising the right to criticize working conditions.
Here is what you can take away from the NLRB Costco decision:

  1. Review your social media policy as well as any other policies which restrict employee communication in light of the General Counsel guidance memos and the Costco decision.
  2. Avoid broad language. If Costco teaches us anything, it is that the NLRB will strike down policies with broad prohibitions on actions or statements by employees that might include critical remarks about working conditions or management. Your policies should be as specific as possible about prohibited conduct so that they cannot be misinterpreted by employees to restrict all critical or negative comments.
  3. Consider a separate policy for management. Keep in mind that the Section 7 right to be critical about wages and other terms and conditions of employment, does not extend to supervisors and managers. Employers should consider whether to issue a separate policy applicable and communicated only to supervisors and managers which makes clear that they are expected to follow more stringent standards concerning social media communication than apply to non-managers.

 

Recent NLRB Rulings May Surprise and Concern You

In recent months, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has grabbed the attention of many employers, union and non-union alike. NLRB decisions and guidance documents have found that a number of very common company policies and practices violate employee rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. Section 7 protects the rights of employees to communicate with co-workers about wages and other working conditions and to act together, including by supporting or joining unions.

In a decision on July 30, 2012, the NLRB continued the trend of finding legal fault with practices that may sound very familiar to you. The decision is Banner Health System dba Banner Estrella Medical Center and James A. Navarro, Case No. 28-CA-023438. One of the issues in the case was the company's routine practice when conducting internal investigations to ask the complaining employee and all witnesses interviewed not to discuss the matter with co-workers while the investigation was ongoing. Sound familiar?

The employer argued that it had a right to request employees not to discuss ongoing investigations in order to protect the integrity of the investigation. This is a common employer concern. Widespread discussion of an ongoing investigation can compromise future interviews by making people aware of the issues before they are talked to. Talk in the workplace about an ongoing investigation could also cause employees to feel intimidated about cooperating. The NLRB found the employer practice an illegal restriction on the rights of employees to discuss workplace issues among themselves. The NLRB considered but rejected the employer's argument that the caution about confidentiality was merely a request, not a mandatory rule. The NLRB left the door open for an employer in some cases to justify a prohibition on employee discussions of ongoing investigations. But, the NLRB said to justify that restriction, the employer would have to be able to show a specific legitimate business justification, not a generalized concern. As an example, the Board said that the employer should be required "to first determine whether in any given investigation witnesses needed protection, evidence was in danger of being destroyed, testimony was in danger of being fabricated, or there was a need to prevent a cover-up."

The NLRB's position puts employers in a tough spot. How do you protect the integrity of an ongoing investigation without asking witnesses to maintain confidentiality at least while the investigation is ongoing? Employers should treat each investigation on an individualized basis. If a decision is made to request confidentiality during an investigation, the employer should document its specific business reason for requesting confidentiality in that case.

The Banner Health System case is just the most recent in a string of NLRB actions attacking what are very common workplace policies. Earlier this year, the NLRB considered handbook disclaimer language about employment at will. The language at issue in both cases was similar to this:

Employment at the company is at the will of the parties. That means that you or the company can end the employment relationship at any time for any reason. The at-will nature of the employment relationship at this company cannot be changed except by a written agreement signed by the President.

Sound familiar?

In two separate actions earlier this year, the NLRB made clear that it considers disclaimer language like this to violate employee's Section 7 rights. In the view of the NLRB, disclaimers like this make it seem to employees that they have no ability to change the at-will nature of their employment, such as by joining a union and perhaps getting a labor contract that might limit discharge to for-cause circumstances. The NLRB theory is that the disclaimer language will "chill" employees from engaging in concerted activity or joining unions because they may feel they cannot change their employment-at-will status by doing so.

With due respect to the NLRB, in my opinion there is a fundamental flaw in this reasoning. The disclaimers simply say that employment at will cannot be changed except by agreement of the company at a high-management level and in writing. That is true under any circumstance, whether it be union or non-union. Even if employees are union-represented a change in the employment-at-will status will not occur unless the company agrees. If a company with union representation changes the employment-at-will status, it is generally done in writing and with the Company's agreement in the collective bargaining agreement. It cannot be forced on the company by the union.

This position of the NLRB also puts employers in a bind. Do you leave employment-at-will disclaimers out of your handbook, and face the risk of an employee claim that some high-level manager made an oral promise of guaranteed employment for a specific term or other protections? Decisions like these and the Banner Health case will have employers scrambling with their counsel to find creative and legal ways to achieve their legitimate business aims.

NLRB General Counsel Issues Another Social Media Memo

On May 30, 2012, the NLRB's General Counsel's Office issued its third Memo addressing social media issues. This one is devoted entirely to its position on the lawfulness of various typical social media policy provisions. Hoping that this third General Counsel Memo would provide greater clarity on the Board's regulation of social media policies, I sat down and read it and, quite frankly, came to the conclusion that the Memo only adds to employers' confusion on what they can and cannot include in their social media policies -- even though the GC took the unusual step of appending to the Memo a social media policy that it considered entirely lawful.

Having spent a fair bit of time pondering the significance of this Memo, I have arrived at this conclusion: Though I am pleased to have a policy that the General Counsel's office has endorsed, the highly nuanced distinctions made between policies considered lawful and unlawful are baffling.

Here are a few examples:

Regarding defamation:

LAWFUL:

Never post any information or rumors that you know to be false about [Employer], fellow associates, members, customers, suppliers people working on behalf of [Employer] or competitors.

UNLAWFUL

You may not make disparaging or defamatory comments about [Employer], its employees, officers, directors, vendors, customers, partners, affiliates, or our, or their products/services.

Regarding the protection of confidential information:

LAWFUL:

Maintain the confidentiality of [Employer] trade secrets and private or confidential information. Trade secrets may include information regarding the development of systems, processes, products, know-how and technology. Do not post internal reports, policies, procedures or other internal business-related confidential communications.

UNLAWFUL:

Employees are prohibited from posting information regarding [Employer] on any social networking sites … that could be deemed material non-public information or any information that is considered confidential or proprietary. Such information includes, but is not limited to, company performance, contracts, customer wins or losses, customer plans, maintenance, shutdowns, work stoppages, cost increases, customer news or business related travel plans and schedules.

Regarding the use of internal complaint procedures:

LAWFUL:

Keep in mind that you are more likely to resolve work related complaints by speaking directly with your co-workers or by utilizing our Open Door Policy than by posting complaints to a social media outlet.

UNLAWFUL:

You are encouraged to resolve concerns about work by speaking with co-workers, supervisors, or managers. [Employer] believes that individuals are more likely to resolve concerns about work by speaking directly with co-workers, supervisors or other management-level personnel than by posting complaints on the Internet. [Employer] encourages employees and other contingent resources to consider using available internal resources, rather than social media or other online forums to resolve these types of concerns.

In assessing how this third Memo impacts their social media policies, employers should keep a few things in mind:

  1. The General Counsel's position on these social media policy provisions is not limited to their appearance in a social media policy. To the extent similar provisions are included elsewhere in employer work rules and policies, the General Counsel's position will be the same. Therefore, it not only is important to have your social media policies reviewed and updated, but all of your employee policies that touch on the issues addressed in this most recent Memo. Any work rule or policy that limits employee communication is likely to be viewed by the NLRB General Counsel with the same attitudes as those found in the social media advice memo.
  2. Although the General Counsel's endorsed policy may provide employers with a safe harbor that keeps challenges at bay, it may not address all issues that any particular employer may feel it needs to address about employee social media use based on the nature of its business or culture. Also, keep in mind that employee discipline in accordance with the policy will still be evaluated by the Board to determine if the employee conduct constituted protected activity under the NLRA. Using the hindsight approach that the General Counsel has used in discipline cases previously reported by the General Counsel's office, it is entirely possible that the General Counsel will take the position that its endorsed policy as applied is unlawful.
  3. The General Counsel's Memorandum is not law, but it does reflect how the Board's regional directors will attempt to enforce the law until we start seeing these issues decided through the Board's adjudication process and in the courts. It may be tempting for employers that feel a strong need to include certain policies that the Memo has found unlawful to test the Board's position, but this decision does not come without serious repercussions. Employers may think that the only risk is that the Board will find their policies unlawful and make them change the policy, but the significance of that risk is magnified when a non-union employer is facing an organizing campaign. Rest assured that any union attempting to organize a workplace will take a long look at the employer's policies and will file unfair labor practice charges regarding any policies it thinks the board will find unlawful. Because of the Board's enforcement posture, the short-term effect might be an order from the NLRB requiring the employer to rescind the policy and to tell employees it was found by the NLRB to be illegal. That could be a real boost for the union organizing effort because it can claim to the employees that the union forced the company to change its illegal rules.  An employer facing a union organizing campaign simply can't afford to give the union this free shot at showing the work force that the company is maintaining unlawful policies and the union's ability to get those policies changed. Worse, a union could attempt to get an employer win in an election overturned by claiming it was obtained as a result of the employers maintenance of unlawful policies that impacted the election results.
  4. To this point, I have been among those attorneys advocating the use of a savings clause or disclaimer noting that the policy is not intended to restrict employees rights to communicate with each other regarding terms and conditions of employment. In his third Memo, the General Counsel found each of the savings clauses he addressed to be insufficient to render otherwise unlawful provisions lawful or to cure ambiguities in the policy under consideration. Interestingly, the policy endorsed by the General Counsel's office does not include any savings clause. Therefore, employers should consider whether to include a savings clause in their social media policies or whether doing so unduly draws employee attention to their Section 7 rights without providing any parallel benefits.

NLRB Launches Webpage Describing Protected Concerted Activity

Continuing its campaign to educate workers, particularly those in non-union settings, regarding their Section 7 rights, the National Labor Relations Board this week launched a new webpage on its website specifically to describe protected concerted activity and to apprise workers of their rights "to act together for their mutual aid and protection, even if they are not in a union."

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") states that:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities.”

To demonstrate what Section 7 rights look like in action, the webpage contains 13 case examples from around the country of employer discipline that the Board found unlawful, which can be viewed by clicking points on a map. The case examples are wide-ranging and span the typically-thought-of examples of employees registering complaints directly to their employers to cases where employees aired their employer grievances on YouTube and Facebook. The diverse range of case examples appears to be a conscious effort by the NLRB to spotlight the ever-expanding face of Section 7 concerted activity in light of social media.

Some of the highlighted cases include stories of:

  • Five construction employees fired after several of them appeared in a YouTube video complaining of hazardous working conditions;
  • A customer service representative fired after discussing wages with another employee, based on a policy in the company handbook that the NLRB found was unlawful;
  • A paramedic fired after posting grievances about her supervisor on Facebook following a work-related incident;
  • An employee fired and threatened with deportation after he delivered a petition protesting their poor living conditions and irregular hours that was signed by several dozen welders who were performing contract work under temporary visas; and
  • Two women fired for telling a newspaper that they, along with a group of poultry workers, walked off the job to protest a new requirement that they pay 50 cents per pair of latex gloves that they used.

In addition to the case examples, the webpage raises the three following questions to guide workers in understanding whether their activity is protected by Section 7:

  1. Is the activity concerted?
  2. Does it seek to benefit other employees?
  3. Is it carried out in way that causes it to lose protection?

The launch follows the NLRB's decision to indefinitely postpone its posting rule that would have required employers to post a notice of employee rights (reported here), which came on the heels of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruling that temporarily barred the NLRB from enforcing its posting rule.

In light of the NLRB's continued attention to this issue, and with the face of concerted activity ever expanding, employers would be prudent to visit the new webpage and review the highlighted cases to be able to recognize concerted activity and to take proactive measures to train managers and HR professionals to recognize concerted activity so employers can correctly address situations that could open them up to liability. 

Court Tells NLRB Not So Fast On "Quickie" Election Rule Changes

The NLRB was issued a stunning rebuke yesterday by U.S. District Court Judge James Boasberg (an Obama appointee) when he ruled that the NLRB's controversial union election rule changes were invalid because they were enacted without the required three-member quorum. The NLRB may appeal Judge Boasberg's decision. However, at least for the present, the Court's decision in Chamber of Commerce, et al. v. NLRB renders the union election rule changes, which took effect April 30, 2012, null and void.

The election rule changes have been the source of considerable tension between employer and union groups for the past year. They were predicted to shorten the period for union elections from the current average of approximately 40 days to as few as 10 to 21 days after a union election petition is filed. The NLRB and pro-labor groups contended the rule changes were desirable because they would streamline the election process and cut down on litigation costs. Employer groups came out strongly against the election rule changes, contending that they gave unions an unfair advantage.

The employer group's strong opposition to the rule changes was shared by NLRB Member Brian Hayes, the lone "Republican" appointee on the Board when the NLRB took its final vote on the rule changes in December, 2011. In fact, Member Hayes was so strongly opposed to the election rule changes that he threatened to resign prior to the vote being taken to prevent the NLRB from having the three-member quorum necessary to approve the rule changes. Ultimately, Member Hayes decided not to resign. However, when the NLRB used its electronic case management system to circulate the final rule among the NLRB's three Members, Member Hayes did not cast a vote or enter an appearance. The other two NLRB Members, both Democratic appointees, did cast votes to adopt the rule changes. The NLRB proceeded with implementing the rule based on those two favorable votes.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed suit seeking to enjoin enactment of the rule changes within days of NLRB's December vote. The Chamber's lawsuit raised multiple substantive and procedural challenges to the election rule changes. However, Judge Boasberg found that it was unnecessary to rule on any but one of the Chamber's arguments because he agreed that the NLRB lacked the authority to issue the rule changes. In what will likely be an oft quoted passage from the decision, the first paragraph of Judge Boasberg presaged the outcome: "According to Woody Allen, eighty percent of life is just showing up. When it comes to satisfying a quorum requirement, though, showing up is even more important than that. Indeed, it is the only thing that matters – even when the quorum is constituted electronically."

The NLRB may appeal Judge Boasberg's decision. Or, it may go back and take another vote on the election rule changes. However, any vote now taken also will be taken with the backdrop that federal litigation is now pending that challenges the three recess appointments that President Obama made to the NLRB on January 4, 2012.
 

Button, Button, Who's Got The Button?

Starbucks recently won a limited victory in a case involving employees wearing pro-union buttons at work. National Labor Relations Board v. Starbucks Corp. Court of Appeals Second Circuit, Case No. 10-3511. A common union organizing tactic is to have pro-union employees wear union buttons at work. Employers often have the mistaken impression that they can ban union buttons at work as part of their dress code or uniform policy. But, the NLRB and courts have consistently held that expressing support for unions by wearing buttons on clothing is a protected means of expression about union organizing. Even if the company policy is to ban other sorts of buttons, like political campaign buttons or sports team buttons, union support buttons cannot be prohibited because wearing them is a special protected form of expression. Employers can restrict wearing union-support buttons only in very limited circumstances, such as when the buttons may scratch or otherwise damage products.

Even though Starbucks prevailed ultimately, the case illustrates how aggressively the NLRB enforces the rights of employees to wear union buttons at work. Starbucks was actually allowing employees to wear one pro-union button while working. The problem came when some employees insisted on wearing multiple union buttons at the same time. In fact, one worker was wearing eight union buttons. Starbucks argued that multiple union buttons detracted from the the impact of certain company-issued buttons and badges relating to the business. The NLRB held that Starbucks could not limit employees to wearing only one pro-union button. Starbucks appealed and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the NLRB and held that Starbucks could limit employees to wearing just one pro-union button at a time. The Court also reversed an NLRB finding that Starbucks had fired an employee for union activity and sent a similar claim regarding another worker back to the NLRB for further consideration.

The lesson: If you are faced with employees wearing pro-union buttons, pins, hats, t-shirts, etc., do not presume you have the right to ban or limit those actions. It is not enough to argue that you enforce restrictions consistently. The right to express support for unionization by wearing the message is one protected under the National Labor Relations Act. You should contact legal counsel before deciding how to handle the issue.
 

Update: NLRB Postpones Posting Rule Indefinitely

The National Labor Relations Board has postponed indefinitely the effective date for its employee rights posting requirement. On its website, the NLRB states:

"The rule, which had been scheduled to take effect on April 30, 2012, will not take effect until the legal issues are resolved. There is no new deadline for the posting requirement at this time."

The NLRB's action is a result of the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals earlier this week enjoining the posting rule while the appeal before that court is pending. (See our earlier post - NLRB Posting Rule Lifted:  At Least For Now.)

NLRB Posting Rule Lifted - At Least For Now

In an order issued today, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia granted a temporary injunction, barring the NLRB from enforcing its posting rule, at least while the appeal before that Court is pending.

We reported yesterday about the decision by a federal District Court in South Carolina invalidating the NLRB posting rule. As we noted, that decision is in contrast with an earlier decision by a federal District Court for the District of Columbia upholding the NLRB's right to impose the rule. The D.C. District Court decision is currently on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which issued the injunction order today. The Court set a briefing schedule for hearing the appeal and directed that oral arguments be set for some time in September. That means the temporary injunction will stay in place at least until sometime this fall.

So, if you are keeping score: the NLRB's rule requiring posting was to take effect on April 30. Both cases filed in federal court challenging the rule have gone against the NLRB, at least for now. The dust will not have settled completely until these cases are decided on appeal. In fact, if there are conflicting decisions in the Courts of Appeal, the issue could reach the U.S. Supreme Court. But at least for now, employers will not be required to post the NLRB employee rights notice on April 30.

NLRB Posting Rule Struck Down by South Carolina Court

Friday the 13th was unlucky for the National Labor Relations Board. A Federal District Court for South Carolina ruled on Friday that the NLRB overstepped its authority by issuing a rule requiring employers to post notices. In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. NLRB, Case No. 2:11-CV-02516-DCN (D.S.C. April 13, 2012), Judge Norton considered the limits on the rights of federal agencies to impose obligations which are different from those Congress has imposed by law. The NLRB was created by Congress under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Relying on the language of the NLRA, Judge Norton found that the NLRB was created to be reactive, not to create new obligations. The Judge found that the NLRB has two roles: conducting union representation elections; and deciding unfair labor practice charges. The Judge decided that because the NLRB has a purely reactive role, and because the NLRA does not establish any obligation for employers to post notices, the NLRB overstepped its authority by issuing the notice posting rule. The Judge noted the fact that in at least eight other federal workplace laws, Congress did include a posting requirement. The Judge reasoned that if Congress had intended a posting requirement under the NLRA, it would have been included in the statute.

The decision is in stark contrast with the earlier decision in National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB, Case No. 11-CV-1629 (D.D.C. March 2, 2012). In that case, the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the Board's right to require posting. (For more discussion about this case, please see our previous post - Federal Court Upholds NLRB Posting Rule.) The D.C. District Court case is on appeal and it is likely the NLRB will appeal the decision of the South Carolina District Court.

So, with conflicting decisions by federal courts in two different parts of the country, what is an employer to do? It is possible the NLRB will postpone the current April 30, 2012 effective date for the posting rule. We will post a notice in this Blog if that happens. But, if the NLRB does not postpone the effective date, it will expect employers to post by April 30, with the possible exception of employers in the jurisdiction of the South Carolina District Court.
 

NLRB Posting Rule Set To Take Effect April 30

None of the various legal challenges to the controversial NLRB posting rule have yet been effective. As things stand now, with only a few very narrow exceptions, all employers will be required as of April 30 to post a notice in the workplace advising employees of their rights regarding unions and their rights to discuss wages and other working conditions with co-workers (see our previous blog posts: "NLRB Issues Final Rule Requiring All Employers to Post Notice About Union Organizing Rights," and "NLRB Posting Requirement Delay - New Date January 31, 2012.")  As we reported recently, the federal court for the District of Columbia upheld the NLRB's right to require the posting. The District Court Judge also rejected a request for a temporary delay (injunction) on the posting requirement while the case is appealed. That means that unless the Appellate Court either issues an injunction or issues a decision between now and April 30 reversing the lower court, the posting requirement will go into effect as scheduled. There is another legal challenge to the posting rule pending in a federal District Court in South Carolina, but no decision has been issued in that case and there is no reason to expect one will be issued before April 30.

The poster is available on the NLRB's web site at www.nlrb.gov. Also, various businesses which offer reproductions of government-required employment postings have already developed products that incorporate the new NLRB posting.

The poster is titled "Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act." It must be posted at all workplaces in conspicuous locations and must be no smaller than 11" x 17". The NLRB also requires employers to include a link to the poster on internal or external web sites if other employment policies are posted there. The poster gives employees a detailed list of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The rights highlighted in the poster include:

  • The right to join a union;
  • The right to bargain with the employer through representatives, such as a union, about wages, benefits, hours, and other working conditions;
  • The right to discuss wages and benefits and other working conditions with co-workers;
  • The right to take action with co-workers to improve working conditions by, among other things, making internal complaints to the employer or to a government agency or by asking for help from a union; and
  • The right to strike and picket;

The poster also notifies employees, in one bullet point, that they alternatively have the right to "choose not to do any of these activities."

The poster also advises employees that it is illegal for an employer to prohibit employees from talking about unions during non-work time, such as breaks or before or after work. It notes that it is illegal for an employer to question employees about their support for a union in a way that discourages them from supporting a union, and to make promises of benefits in order to discourage union support. The poster also notes certain things that unions are not permitted to do, such as threatening or coercing employees to get them to support the union. Finally, the poster advises employees of how to file charges if they feel their rights are being violated.

Employers are understandably wondering what effect will come from this required posting. Will employees not even notice it in the "sea" of already-required employment posters? Or, will this new poster cause employees to think about union organizing and other rights that they might not otherwise have considered? Will it generate questions among employees or questions directed to managers? What about the specific statement that employees have the right to discuss wages among themselves? Many employers make the mistaken presumption that they can ban discussion of wages and benefits among employees as "confidential" and have that prohibition stated in their employee handbooks. This NLRB posting might make it more likely for employees to challenge that rule, either with a complaint to the employer or by filing an unfair labor practice charge. Also take a look at Franck Wobst's posting on March 27 about plans by the NLRB to put up and publicize a website targeted to advise non-union workers of their NLRA rights.

All of these potential effects of the required posting are good reason for non-union employers to review their overall program for staying non-union. As we have noted in the past, the most effective method for staying non-union is to have workplace policies, benefits, and management/supervisor behavior of the sort that makes employees less likely to feel a need for union representation. Some specific things that should be considered include:

  • Does your employee handbook prevent discussion among employees of wages or have any other restrictions that run afoul of the NLRA?
  • It is legal to have handbook provisions which restrict certain employee conduct, such as solicitation during working time or limitations on the right to post or distribute materials. However, it is essential that those rules be tailored specifically so that they do not overreach the employer's rights and violate employee rights. The last thing an employer wants in the middle of a union organizing effort is to be required to rescind rules found to be illegal as a result of an unfair labor practice charge filed by the union.
  • Do you have a policy regarding employee communications or social media? If so, have you examined whether the restrictions might step over the line the NLRB has drawn for limiting what employees can say to each other about the Company and about wages and working conditions?
  • Are your managers aware of the NLRB posting and attuned to how best to respond to questions or concerns that might be raised by employees?
  • Most important, have your managers been trained in and are they committed to the kind of management behavior and communication with workers that makes employees less susceptible to union organizing efforts?

Our Labor & Employment Department will be conducting a complimentary one-hour webinar on Tuesday, April 10, 2012 to help employers sort through best practices concerning the NLRB posting and all of these related implications. We hope you will consider joining us. Watch for further details, which will be circulated soon on this Blog.

NLRB Activism Continues To Gain Steam

While the NLRB Posting Rule, which is scheduled to become effective April 30, 2012, has rightly received much attention from concerned employers and employer advocacy groups, it isn't the only thing non-union businesses should be concerned about in the coming weeks.

Last Friday, March 23, 2012, an NLRB spokesperson confirmed that the NLRB intends to also launch a website in April that will provide information to non-union workers about their rights under the National Labor Relations Act that includes information far beyond their rights with respect to forming a union. According to the spokesperson, the website will focus on educating workers about their rights to engage in protected concerted activity and will include specific examples based on real life cases. We would expect these examples to include that the NLRA gives employees the right to discuss their wage rates with one another, and that they have the right to express their views about employer policies and practices even in terms that the employer may consider to be disloyal or insubordinate.

This is an area of the law that has received relatively little national attention for decades. We suspect that many employers make disciplinary and termination decisions without properly assessing whether the employee's rule violation might actually be deemed by the NLRB to be protected concerted activity. Employers would be well-advised to educate themselves in this area before the NLRB educates their workforces.
 

A New Challenge to President Obama's Recess Appointments in Federal Court Means a Decision on the Constitutionality of the Appointments is Getting Closer

The first challenge to President Obama's recess appointments, which was an attempt to bootstrap the issue to a federal lawsuit targeting the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") notice-posting rule, has come and gone. The court did not address the constitutionality of the President's appointments, who emerged unscathed. Now, and more determined than ever, business groups are picking up the gauntlet and challenging the appointments through more conventional means.

As we reported earlier, the National Right to Work Foundation (“NRWF”), was the first to ensure the issue of the constitutionality of the President's appointments would be decided when it filed motions in six cases it has with the NLRB seeking to disqualify the three purported recess appointees from participating in those cases.

On February 24, 2012, Noel Canning, a bottling company, took a different approach and filed a lawsuit (Noel Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115 pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) appealing the NLRB's February 8, 2012 decision that held that it violated the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") by unlawfully refusing to reduce to writing a verbal collective bargaining agreement with a union. According to Noel Canning's Petition for Review, the NLRB's decision was invalid. While the decision was decided by three of the five NLRB members, two of the three decision makers (Sharon Block and Terence F. Flynn) are two of the controversial appointees whose appointments are being challenged as unconstitutional. Accordingly, if the recess appointments are deemed unconstitutional, the decision was rendered by only one NLRB member, not with the statutorily required quorum of at least three members, and the decision would be invalid.

On March 15, 2012, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce ("Chamber"), joined by the Coalition for a Democratic Workplace ("CDW"), came through on the promises it made after the controversial recess appointments and took legal action by filing a motion to intervene in the Noel Canning lawsuit. The motion to intervene, according to the Chamber, is designed to get a swift and decisive ruling as to whether the President’s recess appointments to the NLRB unlawfully circumvented the Senate’s constitutional power to provide advice and consent to the appointment of executive branch officers. Thus, while the actual issue in the case is quite narrow, the case gives the Chamber and the CDW the means to make the more important argument challenging the constitutionality of the President's appointments.

The issue of the constitutionality of the President's recess appointments now sits before the NLRB and before the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. No doubt, these two cases will not be the last of the challenges we see in either forum, but more importantly, we are getting closer to a decision as to the constitutionality of the President's recess appointments î º a decision that will certainly impact not only labor law for some time but constitutional law going forward.
 

Update: Challenges to NLRB Posting Rule

We reported yesterday about the decision in the federal District Court for the District of Columbia which upheld the NLRB rule requiring a posting about union organizing rights. The plaintiffs in that lawsuit who were challenging the posting rule filed an appeal Monday in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. In the appeal, the National Association of Manufacturers and the other plaintiffs have asked the Court to issue an injunction stopping the NLRB from implementing the posting rule on the current April 30, 2012 effective date and delaying implementation until the appeal has been decided. We will keep a close eye on the case and report any further developments, particularly any impact on the current April 30 effective date.

Federal Court Upholds NLRB Posting Rule

In a decision on Friday, March 2, the federal District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the right of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to require all employers to post a notice regarding employee rights to join unions. National Association of Manufacturers, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board, et al., U.S.D.C. 1:11-cv-01629. The posting rule is currently scheduled to take effect on April 30, 2012. At least one of the parties that filed the challenge in the D.C. Circuit has promised to appeal and there is a similar challenge to the rule still pending in federal district court in South Carolina. Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board, (Dist. S. C.) 2:11-cv-02516.

Judge Amy Berman Jackson upheld the NLRB's right to impose the posting rule, finding that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) gives the NLRB broad authority to make enforcement rules. The Judge rejected arguments by the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Right-To-Work Legal Defense & Education Foundation, and the Coalition for a Democratic Workplace challenging the NLRB's right to require posting. However, the Court did not reject all of the arguments challenging the posting rule. The Court ruled that the NLRB overstepped its authority by including in the rule provisions saying that failure to post is automatically an unfair labor practice. The Court also struck down that portion of the rule which said that if an employer fails to post, the time limit for an employee to file an unfair labor practice charge would not begin to run.

A few important questions remain after this decision. First and foremost, will the NLRB stand firm on its April 30th deadline for posting, even if this decision is appealed and even if the South Carolina case is still pending? We will follow that question closely. Another question raised by this decision is how the NLRB will enforce the posting rule, considering the Court's ruling that failure to post is not, standing alone, an unfair labor practice and that failure to post does not have the effect of delaying the start of the time limit for filing an unfair labor practice charge.

In earlier Blog posts, we have commented on the posting requirement, the impact on employers, and these legal challenges. (See previous blogs:  "NLRB Postpones Effective Date for Posting Again;" "Update:  Legal Challenges to NLRB Posting Rule;" "Arguments Begin In Legal Challenges to NLRB Posting Rule;" "NLRB Posting Requirement Delay - New Date - January 31, 2012;" "Update:  NLRB Releases Union Organizing Poster on Website; Challenges to Rule Begin;" "NLRB Issues Final Rule Requiring All Employers to Post Notice About Union Organizing Rights;" and "NLRB Seems Determined to Make Union Organizing More Easy.")  As we noted previously, this posting will be required of all employers who are subject to the NLRB's jurisdiction and, for all intents and purposes, that means most companies in the private sector. Considering that the NLRB posting requirement places the issue of union organizing prominently in front of employees, employers should be re-visiting their efforts to maintain non-union status. As we noted in a previous post:

Between now and the April 30 required posting date, employers should consider their overall measures for staying union-free. Are workplace policies, benefits, and management/ supervisor behavior of the sort that employees are less likely to feel a need for union representation? Have supervisors been made aware of the critical role that they play in providing a workplace where employees will be less likely to feel a need for union representation? Are supervisors aware of the proper, legal way to respond if union organizing activity does happen? Now is an opportune time for companies to re-examine their commitment to these things and establish or continue best measures for union avoidance.

The House Committee on Education and the Workforce Vows to Continue Its "Aggressive Oversight" of President Obama's Recess Appointments and Future Actions Taken by the "Obama" NLRB

The House Committee on Education and the Workforce, chaired by Rep. John Kline (R-MN), held its hearing Wednesday, February 7, 2012 titled, “The NLRB Recess Appointments: Implications for America’s Workers and Employers.”

As Chairman Kline explained in his opening remarks, the Committee's "primary concern is the fear and uncertainty [that President Obama's] action [in making three recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")] has unleashed – the fear of the activist NLRB’s future actions and the uncertainty of whether its mandates and decisions can stand under constitutional scrutiny.”

Given that the Chairman framed the issue as a "constitutional crisis," noting, “[t]he highly controversial nature of the appointments guarantees the rules and decisions the new board members adopt will be constitutionally suspect and legally challenged," it is no wonder that the recess appointments did not weather well under the Workforce Committee's aggressive oversight.

Chairman Kline continued his assault on President Obama's recess appointments by referring to President Obama's actions taken during the Senate's pro forma sessions as, creating an "embarrassing contradiction":

According to the rationale of the administration, pro forma sessions are nothing more than a “gimmick” that do not interrupt a recess of Congress; therefore, the president can fill these positions without the Senate’s consent. Decisions based on shaky legal ground can often lead to embarrassing contradictions. Days before the president decided to become the arbiter of congressional rules and proceedings, Congress approved a bill to prevent a tax hike on millions of Americans. Later that day the president signed that very same bill into law. Either the payroll tax cut passed by the Senate during a pro forma session is the law of the land and the recess appointments are invalid, or 170 million Americans are receiving tax relief unlawfully and the appointments should stand. No amount of legal manipulation can allow the president to have it both ways.

Charles J. Cooper, an experienced constitutional law attorney, gave testimony and referred to the same inconsistent conduct as an " inconvenient truth":

In passing the payroll tax cut extension, the Senate acted by unanimous consent, the same procedure by which the Senate confirms most presidential nominees. If the Senate can pass legislation by unanimous consent during a pro forma session, then it can surely confirm the President’s nominees in the same manner, especially if there is an immediate and indisputable need for it to do so."

Mr. Cooper also used President Obama's own words in speaking about his appointment of Richard Cordray to the position of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") Director (who was appointed in the same controversial recess appointments) to suggest that the appointments were a calculated move to sidestep the Senate:

President Obama abandoned any pretense that he was acting because the Senate was unavailable to consider the nomination. To the contrary, the President declared that he was making the recess appointment despite the fact that the Senate had been considering the nomination for over six months. This is what he said: “Now, I nominated Richard [Cordray] for [the position of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB")] last summer . . . For almost half a year, Republicans in the Senate have blocked Richard's confirmation. They refused to even give Richard an up or down vote . . . .” The President was not complaining that the Senate was unavailable or unable to confirm Mr. Cordray. He was complaining that the Senate refused to confirm Mr. Cordray. And, as he candidly proclaimed: “I refuse to take no for an answer.” Thus, the President himself has openly acknowledged that his purpose in recess appointing Mr. Cordray to the CFPB had nothing to do with the only purpose offered by his lawyers at OLC as providing a constitutional justification for the exercise of his power to do so. The President’s January 4 recess appointments were driven not by any concern that the Senate was unavailable to perform its constitutional role in the appointment of government officers, but rather by the President’s determination, openly avowed, to circumvent the Senate's role.

Former Democrat board member, Dennis M. Devaney, and former regional attorney for the NLRB, Stefan J. Marculewicz, also gave testimony that, by and large, focused on the practical implications of the President's appointments. The glaring concern they noted, is a repeat of New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S.Ct. 2635. But as Mr. Marculewicz noted, now the stakes are higher. The cases decided by the two-member board at issue in New Process Steel were generally non-controversial and the NLRB was able to revisit those cases without many lasting effects. Now, and with a full five-member Board, the NLRB is likely to rule on more substantive issues with far-reaching implications. A few hot-button issues coming up include:

  1. Employees and Social Media: The NLRB will likely issue its stance on protections for employees who use social media to engage in concerted activities as there has been little guidance from the Board on how it will deal with these issues, though the Board's Office of the General Counsel has been active on this issue, which we reported on here.
  2. Employee Property Rights and Email Access: Roundy's Inc., 356 NLRB No. 27 (November 12, 2010), currently before the Board, will address the issue of access to the employer’s premises by nonemployee union agents, employer private property interests, and protected section 7 rights. It also raises the broader issue of the proper analytical framework used to determine discrimination under the Act.
  3. The Scope of Specialty Healthcare: The scope of Specialty Healthcare, 357 NLRB No. 83 (2011), wherein the Board enunciated a new standard for determining the appropriateness of bargaining units and stated that groups of employees who are "readily identifiable as a group (based on job classifications, departments, functions, work locations, skills, or similar factors)" will be considered appropriate bargaining units.

Although plaintiff-side proponents of the recess appointments are concerned about workers losing their rights, based on Chairman Klein's closing statement that "[t]o protect workers and employers, the committee will continue to conduct aggressive oversight of the so-called recess appointments and future actions taken by the Obama board," this is going to be an issue that is not going away and one that bears watching.

The Saga Continues...While the NLRB Fights Back and Gets Hit Once Again, Congress Gets in on the Action

When we left off, numerous business groups had lobbed the first attack at President Barack Obama’s three recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) by adding it to their pending lawsuit challenging the NLRB’s highly controversial “Notice Posting Rule,” set to take effect on April 30, 2012.

On January 30, 2012, the NLRB responded, but opted to stay clear of the issue on everyone’s mind—whether the appointment were constitutional or not? Instead, it punted the issue and took a safer approach arguing that the business groups lacked standing to challenge the appointments in the notice-posting lawsuit. The crux of the NLRB’s response was that the notice-posting rule was promulgated before the recess appointments were made. Thus, the newly-constituted NLRB—constitutional or not—will not have to actually act for employers to be under a legal duty to post the required notice come April 30th. The NLRB also argued that any purported injury suffered would be purely speculative and is “not sufficiently concrete to confer standing."

The business groups will have an opportunity to respond, but one of the groups, the National Right to Work Foundation (“NRWF”), has already taken steps to ensure that the issue of the constitutionality of the appointments will be decided, one way or another. It did so, as we predicted, by filing motions (click here to see the motion filed in Stewart v. UFCW Local 99 & Fry’s Foods of AZ) with the NLRB to disqualify the three purported recess appointees from participating in its six cases pending before the NLRB. Like in the federal lawsuit, the NRWF argues that the appointments are unconstitutional and that the Board lacks the quorum necessary to hear cases. It is likely that we will see many other businesses and business group filing similar motions with the NLRB.

The cases involved are: Richards & Yost v. Steelworkers; Sands v. Food & Commercial Workers; Gray v. Coupled Products, LLC & UAW Local 2049; Lugo v. Electrical Workers Local 34; Geary v. Nurses & Allied Professionals Local 5008; and Stewart v. UFCW Local 99 & Fry’s Foods of AZ.

And if you were wondering about  H.R. 3770 - the Executive Appointments Reform Act (EARA), it was assigned to a congressional committee on January 10, 2012, which will consider it before possibly sending it on to the House or Senate as a whole.

While the EARA sits, the House Education and the Workforce Committee will hold a hearing titled "The NLRB Recess Appointments: Implications for America's Workers and Employees," on Tuesday, February 7, 2012, at 10:00 a.m. (click here to access the Live Webcast on that date and time) to examine the NLRB recess appointments. It is foreseeable that the recess appointments will not weather well under the Workforce Committee's microscope given the extremely touchy relationship between the Workforce Committee and the NLRB.

This hearing will follow the Committee on Oversight & Government Reform's hearing held February 1, 2012 titled, “Uncharted Territory: What are the Consequences of President Obama's Unprecedented ‘Recess’ Appointments?" The broader-focused hearing also took up President Obama's appointment of former Ohio Attorney General, Richard Cordray, as Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director.

During the hearing, Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) testified as to the danger created if short periods of non-session by the Senate, like the ones at issue, were deemed sufficient to adjourn session and trigger the President's recess appointment power:

"if an intersession adjournment of less than three days were sufficient for the President to be able to exercise this recess appointment power, it is unclear what, if anything, would prevent the President from routinely bypassing the Constitutions' advice and consent requirement and appointing nominees during even weekend adjournments, which routinely involve periods of 72-hours, or more, in which the Senate may not be actually in the practice of holding committee hearings, and voting, and so forth."

(For more, click here to access the streaming video of that hearing). 
 

NLRB General Counsel's Office's Second Social Media Report Still Leaves Questions Regarding Social Media Policies Unanswered

On Wednesday, the NLRB General Counsel's Office issued its second report on social media cases that have been brought to it for advice by regional directors. Our take on the first Report can be found here.  As noted in the Board's press release which links to the Report, the Report covers 14 cases, half of which involve questions about employer social media policies. Five of those policies were found to be unlawfully broad, one was lawful, and one was found to be lawful after it was revised. The remaining cases involved discharges of employees after they posted comments to Facebook. Several discharges were found to be unlawful because they flowed from unlawful policies. But in one case, the discharge was upheld despite an unlawful policy because the employee’s posting was not work-related.

With respect to the discharge cases, the Board's press release notes that the Report underscores that "[a]n employee’s comments on social media are generally not protected if they are mere gripes not made in relation to group activity among employees." Indeed, as we have noted previously, the Board does appear to be gaining some consistency in this regard. Somewhat troubling, however, is the Board's continued reliance on whether and how co-workers respond to the Facebook post in determining whether the original post is entitled to Section 7 protections. Doing so seems like an easy vehicle for potentially transforming what really was a personal gripe without any obvious intent to initiate or induce coworkers to engage in group action, into what the Board views as concerted activity. On the other hand, the Board hopefully will continue to view negative co-worker responses as evidence of the lack of concerted activity.

With respect to the lawfulness of social media policies, the Board's press release notes simply that "[e]mployer policies should not be so sweeping that they prohibit the kinds of activity protected by federal labor law, such as the discussion of wages or working conditions among employees." Though the cases cited in the Report give employers some examples of permissible policy provisions, it is still lacking in more concrete general guidance about what is permissible. In particular, the Report fails to give a clear thumbs up or thumbs down to the effectiveness of a disclaimer in a social media policy that disavows any intent to restrict employees' rights to communicate with each other regarding terms and conditions of employment.
 

Two of the cited cases touch on this issue. In the first, the Report refers to an employer's social media policy that generally tells employees they should avoid discussing themselves as the Employer’s employees unless discussing terms and conditions of employment "in an appropriate manner." The policy also included what the Report refers to as a "savings clause," which provided that the policy "would not be interpreted or applied so as to interfere with employee rights to self-organize, form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from engaging in such activities." The General Counsel's Office concluded in this case that the savings clause did not sufficiently cure the ambiguities in the policy, however, because employees could not reasonably be expected to understand that it "encompassed discussions the Employer deems 'inappropriate.'" The second case did not address the issue as directly, but in finding the employer's social media policy unlawful simply stated that it contained examples that could reasonably be read to prohibit protected conduct and "contained no limiting language excluding Section 7 activity from its restriction." This latter phrase, buried in the middle of the Report, may provide the clearest indication to date that the Board might approve a disclaimer to permit provisions such as non-disparagement provisions, that it otherwise would view as prohibited. Of course, at the end of the day, a lot will depend on whether the employer actually enforces the policy against conduct the Board considers to be protected.

For those of you keeping a scorecard, below I have listed the policies that the Report found to be lawful and those it found to be unlawful. Keep in mind that some of the unlawful policies potentially could be saved by either providing examples and context of prohibited conduct or by using an effective disclaimer.

Lawful:

  • Prohibition against the use of social media to post or display comments about coworkers,r supervisors, or the Employer that are vulgar, obscene, threatening, intimidating, harassing, or a violation of the Employer’s workplace policies against discrimination, harassment, or hostility on account of age, race, religion, sex, ethnicity, nationality, disability, or other protected class, status, or characteristic.
  • Policy providing that the employer could request employees to confine their social networking to matters unrelated to the company if necessary to ensure compliance with securities regulations and other laws.
  • Prohibition against using or disclosing confidential and/or proprietary information, including personal health information about customers or patients, and it also prohibited employees from discussing in any form of social media “embargoed information,” such as launch and release dates and pending reorganizations.
  • While engaging in social networking activities for personal purposes, employees must indicate that their views were their own and did not reflect those of their employer. Employees were also prohibited from referring to the Employer by name and from publishing any promotional content. (These provisions appeared in a section entitled “Promotional Content,” which included a preface explaining that “special requirements apply to publishing promotional content online.” It defines such content as “designed to endorse, promote, sell, advertise, or otherwise support the Employer and its products and services.)

Unlawful:

  • Making disparaging comments about the company through any media, including online blogs, other electronic media or through the media.
  • In external social networking situations, employees should generally avoid identifying themselves as the Employer’s employees, unless there was a legitimate business need to do so or when discussing terms and conditions of employment in an appropriate manner.
  • General work rules prohibiting "disrespectful conduct" and "inappropriate conversations" (but the General Counsel's office found the employee's Facebook posts to be unprotected anyway).
  • Prohibition against using social media to engage in unprofessional communication that could negatively impact the Employer’s reputation or interfere with the Employer’s mission, or unprofessional/inappropriate communication regarding members of the Employer’s community (but again finding that the Facebook post was not protected).
  • Prohibition against disclosing or communicating information of a confidential, sensitive, or non-public information concerning the company on or through company property to anyone outside the company without prior approval of senior management or the law department (in the absence of any context or examples of the types of information it deems confidential, sensitive, or non-public in order to clarify that the policy does not prohibit Section 7 activity).
  • Prohibition against using the company’s name or service marks outside the course of business without prior approval of the law department (in the absence of clarification that this policy was not directed against by employees’ non-commercial use of a name, logo, or other trademark to identify the Employer in the course of engaging in Section 7 activity).
  • Prohibition against publishing any representation about the company without prior approval by senior management and the law department. The prohibition included statements to the media, media advertisements, electronic bulletin boards, weblogs, and voice mail.
  • Requirement that social networking site communications be made in an honest, professional, and appropriate manner, without defamatory or inflammatory comments regarding the employer and its subsidiaries, and their shareholders, officers, employees, customers, suppliers, contractors, and patients.
  • Requirement that employees obtain approval to identify themselves as the Employer’s employees and that those employees who had identified themselves as such on social media sites must expressly state that their comments are their personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the Employer’s opinions (particularly where it appeared that the rule required this disclaimer every time the employee posted).
  • Requirement that employees first discuss with their supervisor or manager any work-related concerns. Failure to comply could result in corrective action, up to and including termination.
  • Prohibition against discriminatory, defamatory, or harassing web entries about specific employees, work environment, or work-related issues on social media sites.

It should be apparent to all that the Board's interpretation of what is a lawful or unlawful policy is very nuanced. Where possible, examples or context should be provided for any specific policies that arguably can be interpreted as infringing on employees Section 7 rights. In addition, employers should consider a disclaimer in the policy disavowing any intent to infringe on those rights. Finally, the Board's consideration of the lawfulness of social media policies appears to be heavily influenced by how those policies are enforced. Employers should seek legal counsel in drafting or reviewing their social media policies and before taking disciplinary action against employees for their social media activity.

And So It Begins: President Obama's Recess Appointments Face Their First Attacks

On Friday, January 13, 2012, a number of business groups, including the National Federation of Independent Business, National Right to Work Foundation, Coalition for a Democratic Workplace, lodged the first legal challenge seeking to block President Barack Obama’s January 4, 2012 recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).

Procedurally, the groups bootstrapped their challenge to a lawsuit pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the NLRB’s highly controversial “Notice Posting Rule” that would require businesses to post notices and inform employees right to bargain collectively, distribute union literature, and engage in other union activities without reprisal under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which is set become effective April 30, 2012.

As we more fully discussed here on January 6th, the NRLB lost its quorum when former Member Craig Becker’s term expired on January 3, 2012. President Obama then appointed Terence Flynn, Sharon Block, and Richard Griffith to the NLRB. The business groups argue in their motion and accompanying legal memorandum that these appointments are “unconstitutional, null and void,” because they were done while the Senate was in session, leaving no “recess” during which time President Obama could make appointments “without seeking or obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate.” As a result, the NLRB, with only two members, lacks the necessary quorum and ultimately “authority to implement or enforce” the Notice Posting Rule pursuant to New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S.Ct. 2635 (2010).

The challenge came just one day after the Office of the Attorney General made public its Memorandum Opinion (dated January 6, 2012) defending the appointments. In it, the Justice Department argued President Obama had authority to make the appointments because the Senate’s pro forma sessions did not have the legal effect of interrupting an intra-session recess otherwise long enough to qualify as a recess of the Senate under the Recess Appointments Clause. Thus, the President could use his discretion to conclude “that the Senate is unavailable to perform its advise-and-consent function and to exercise his power to make recess appointments.”

U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson, an Obama nominee who has been on the bench since March 18, 2011, will hear the challenges to the Notice Posting Rule and to President Obama’s recess appointments. Regardless of her decision, the case will likely make its way up to the Supreme Court due to the unique nature of the issues raised.

Not to be outdone, the legislature also has filed its first shot against the recess appointments. Representative Jeff Landry, R-La, unveiled H.R. 3770 - the Executive Appointment Reform Act (“EARA”) to, as he deems it, “Stop the Exploitation of Recess Appointments” by barring the NLRB from having a quorum until its members are confirmed by the Senate. The legislation would also cut off payments to any individuals appointed during a Senate recess and put limits on an appointee's ability to perform voluntary or gratuitous service.

More than 70 House Republicans also have signed onto a resolution that would state Congressional dissatisfaction with President Obama’s actions.
 

NLRB Continues to Tackle Social Media Issues

The last six weeks or so have brought us a flood of NLRB General Counsel Advice Memoranda addressing whether an employee's social media activity is protected concerted activity for which he or she may not be disciplined. In his excellent Ohio Employers Law Blog, John Hyman discusses four of them and suggests that the NLRB may be settling in on, dare I say, a more reasoned position when it comes to these kinds of cases. In three of those cases, the General Counsel's Office recommended dismissal because the employee at issue was merely venting an individual gripe and was not seeking to incite group action. In the fourth, the General Counsel's office concluded that the employee was rightfully terminated after refusing to delete a comment accusing the employer of fraudulent accounting practices after it was demonstrated that her allegations were false.

On January 3rd, the General Counsel's Office issued two new Advice Memoranda relating to social media issues. In Miami Jewish Health Systems, the charging party, a nurse who had been transferred from the ICU to another position, wrote an email, though Facebook, to a former co-worker who still worked at the hospital. In her email, she asked if the manager was "still there making life miserable for u guys" and if he was "still the wimp he is." In addition, he asked, "How long u gonna put up wit that?" The former co-worker apparently didn't share the charging party's views on the manager and reported the charging party. The General Counsel's Office concluded that the charge should be dismissed relying again on the concept that the employee was simply airing a personal gripe and was not an effort to initiate group action.

The second Advice Memorandum, Thomson Reuters provides an opportunity to update to an earlier post of ours here where we discussed a news article on this dispute. The Advice Memorandum discusses several issues arising out of what appears to have been some fairly contentious collective bargaining. During this time period, the employer invited employees to visit its new Twitter feed and encouraged them to "join the conversation on making Reuters the best place to work." One of the employees, a journalist, wrote on her own personal Twitter feed – which did not reference her affiliation with the employer – that "one way to make this the best place to work is to deal honestly with Guild members." The next day, the journalist's bureau chief called to "remind" her that the company's Twitter policy prohibited tweeting about anything that would damage the employer's reputation. Although no formal disciplinary action appears to have been taken against her, the journalist noted that from that point forward she refrained from tweeting about the employer's Twitter feed. Nevertheless, the Board concluded that the employer's policy and its application to this journalist violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because it would reasonably tend to chill the employees in the exercise of their Section 7 right to engage in concerted activity. The General Counsel concluded – consistent with the Board's approach to date – that broad prohibitions against damaging the employer's reputation, embarrassing the employer, and the like, without providing "limitations or examples" renders the policy overbroad and unlawful. In addition, the application of the policy to this particular tweet demonstrated to the General Counsel's Office the overbroad nature of the policy. Finally, the Advice Memorandum goes on to conclude that the specific application of the policy to this particular tweet also violated Section 8(a)(1), noting that the tweet about "dealing honestly" with the union was not so disloyal as to lose protection.

Perhaps I am starting to become numb to the NLRB's treatment of these issues, but there is nothing monumental about any of the General Counsel's treatment of the social media issues arising out of any of these cases. Though all of us on the employer side of the equation certainly wish that Board would be more sensitive to their concerns about employee social media use, we at least may be starting to see the next best alternative, consistency in approach.
 

Your Supervisors May Not Be Who You Think They Are Under the National Labor Relations Act

A manager's involvement in the disciplinary process isn't necessarily enough to make them a "supervisor" under the National Labor Relations Act, according to a recent NLRB decision.

In DirecTV, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 149 (Dec. 22, 2011)  the Board, in a 2-1 decision, held that DirecTV's "field supervisors" weren't actually supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act. Section 2(11) of the NLRA defines supervisors as individuals who have certain authority with respect to other employees, including the ability to discipline or "effectively recommend" discipline for other employees. The issue arose following a representation election won by the union. DirecTV argued that the field supervisors were "supervisors" under the NLRA and that the field supervisors' pro-union activities during the pre-election period interfered with the employees' free choice in the election. DirecTV asked the NLRB to invalidate the election.

In addition to leading team meetings, answering their team members' technical questions, and examining their work, field supervisors had authority to issue verbal warnings to their team members and, using a separate process, to initiate other levels of discipline, including termination. This process involved a form that field supervisors completed with the relevant facts and, in the form, the field supervisor identified the discipline that he thought appropriate. Then the field supervisor's manager, the site manager, and human resources would review the form, and in some cases review the performance and disciplinary history of the employee to be disciplined and consult with the field supervisor before making a final decision. In the majority of cases, the field supervisor's recommended action would be taken.

The Board found that the field supervisors' involvement in the disciplinary process didn't give them the authority to "effectively recommend" discipline to meet the NLRA's definition of supervisor. Noting that such authority exists when the employer takes the supervisor's recommended action without independent investigation, the majority found that DirecTV was performing independent investigations when others in management reviewed the field supervisors' forms, and in particular, when the site manager reviewed the disciplinary and performance history of employees to be disciplined. They also found it unpersuasive that DirecTV usually followed the actions that field supervisors recommended.

The Board's DirecTV decision is just another example of Board decisions that can make things more difficult for companies faced with organizing activity. It is essential that an employer can identify with confidence those employees who are supervisors because the role, responsibilities and authority of supervisors during union organizing is so crucial to the employer mounting an effective and legal response to the organizing.

One key takeaway from this decision is that employees who perform some traditionally supervisory duties may still not meet the definition of supervisor under the NLRA, even when they are involved in the disciplinary process. Even before union activity ever occurs companies are wise to evaluate the scope of duties and responsibilities given to supervisors with an eye toward how those jobs might be viewed by the NLRB if organizing does occur.
 

President Obama's Move to Sidestep the Senate with His Recess Appointments

When the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) lost its statutory authority to issue rulings because its normally five-person membership fell to two last week, President Obama made three recess appointments sparking a new controversy between Democrats and Republicans.

One reason the appointments have generated so much attention stems from New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB , 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010), where the United States Supreme Court held that the five-member NLRB cannot delegate its authority to fewer than three members. Thus, a two-person board is not a quorum and is powerless to render decisions. Since Wilma Leibman's term expired in August 2011, the NLRB had been functioning as a three-member unit. The NLRB lost that three-person quorum when Craig Becker's term expired at the end of 2011.

Just days before Becker's term expired and as lawmakers were scheduled to leave on holiday break, President Obama nominated Democrats Sharon Block, a Labor Department Official, and Richard Griffin, General Counsel for the International Union of Operating Engineers who also serves on the board of directors for the AFL-CIO Lawyers, to the NLRB. Griffin is only the second nominee ever to come directly from a labor union. Becker, another controversial Obama recess appointee, was the first. Earlier in 2011, President Obama nominated Republican Terrance Flynn, an NLRB attorney, for appointment to the NLRB, but the Senate while in session did not act on the nomination.

In an attempt to stop the President from making good on his threat to make recess appointments, the Republican Senate began holding pro forma sessions over the holiday to technically avoid recessing – a strategy employed in 2007 by the then-Democratic Senate to block President George W. Bush from making recess appointments.

With the Senate and the President at a standoff, President Obama called the Senate's bluff and seated all three NLRB nominees.

Labor and Democrats are praising President Obama's NLRB appointments. Republicans, on the other hand, argue that the President's appointments are unconstitutional and an attempt to circumvent the Senate's roll to "advise and consent."

Given the outcry from Senate Republicans and the stakes, there is little doubt that the constitutionality of the President's appointments will be challenged.

The key issue will likely be: "How long must the Senate be away to technically be on "recess?" Although the Constitution gives the president the "[p]ower to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate," which do not have to be confirmed by the Senate and allows the appointees to serve until the end of 2012, it fails to identify how long the Senate must be on "recess" before the president can exercise his recess appointment power. This topic has been debated by legal experts for years and Senate Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell (R-Ky) argues that "long-standing precedent ... limited the President to recess appointments only when the Senate is in a recess of 10 days or longer," which did not occur in this instance.

To make a challenge most directly, Republicans can ask a federal court to rule that the Senate was in session and seek to invalidate the appointments. If this happens, New Process Steel, L.P., which invalidated nearly 600 opinions issued by the two-member NLRB made between 2007 and 2009, provides guidance and would likely make invalid any NLRB decisions issued by the NLRB while the disputed appointees are in place. Just as happened after the New Process Steel case, that will force federal courts and a properly-seated NLRB to decide the cases again.

In a similar move with particular interest to those familiar with Ohio politics, President Obama also appointed former Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray as director to the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) (an agency vehemently opposed by Republicans). President Obama first nominated Cordray in July 2011, but the Senate Republicans used the threat of a filibuster to prevent a confirmation vote and vowed not to support any nominee, regardless of party affiliation, to be the CFPB director unless Democrats agreed to new legislation. The Senate refusal to budge on the issue rendered the CFPB powerless because it cannot issue rules without a director. Like the NLRB recess appointments, it is likely the Cordray appointment will face constitutional challenge.
 

NLRB Postpones Effective Date for Posting Again

The National Labor Relations Board has agreed to postpone the effective date of its employee rights notice-posting rule at the request of the federal court in Washington, DC hearing a legal challenge regarding the rule. The Board’s says it has determined that postponing the effective date of the rule would facilitate the resolution of the legal challenges that have been filed with respect to the rule. The new implementation date is April 30, 2012. A copy of the NLRB's very brief Press Release can be accessed here.

Update: NLRB Votes on "Quickie Election" Rules

As we reported last week, on November 18th, the NLRB announced that it would vote on "whether to adopt a small number of the amendments to its election procedures that it had proposed earlier this year." Yesterday, the Board moved forward with that vote. Predictably, the two Democratic Board members voted in favor of the amendments while Republican appointee, Brian Hayes dissented. Member Hayes had threatened to resign from the Board in order to block the vote from going through, but ultimately decided not to do that.

The controversial NLRB proposed rule includes various measures that would significantly shorten the time between when a petition for a representation election is filed and when the election occurs, making it difficult for employers to adequately respond to union organizer claims and promises. In response to the anticipated vote, the Republican majority in the House of Representatives was able to pass a bill intended to override the NLRB vote, but that measure almost certainly has no chance of passing in the Senate, where the Democrats have the majority.

It is expected that the Board will attempt to issue and vote on a final rule before the end of the year. We will keep you up to date on any developments on this critical story.
 

NLRB to Vote on "Quickie Election" Rules

The NLRB announced on Friday that the three-member Board will vote on November 30 on "whether to adopt a small number of the amendments to its election procedures that the Board proposed earlier this year." The controversial NLRB proposed rule included various measures that would significantly shorten the time between when a petition for a representation election is filed and when the election occurs.

Republican NLRB appointee Hayes, who has expressed strong opposition to the proposed rules, estimates that, under the new timeframes, elections might occur in 10-21 days after a petition is filed, as opposed to the average current time of 38 days. Because the proposed "quickie elections" could significantly hamper an employer's opportunity to communicate to workers before the election, the business community has also expressed significant concern about the proposed rules.

The November 30 vote is timed to occur before the expiration in January of the appointment of Democratic-appointee Becker. When Member Becker's term expires, Democrats will lose their majority on the current three member Board. Member Hayes has contacted Congress, arguing that the two Democratic members are trying to push the rule-making through without giving him adequate opportunity for dissent. Even if the vote goes forward as scheduled, we expect further legal challenges to the propriety of the action.
 

NLRB General Counsel's Advice Memorandum in Schulte Offers a New Twist on the Old Facebook Firing Theme

Just when I started to think that I might have the answers regarding the NLRB's obsession with social media, the NLRB starts changing the questions. Not that that is always a bad thing. Just ask Schulte, Roth & Zabel.

In Schulte, the charging party alleged that he was terminated for his role in employee discussions about the employer's allegedly unlawful overtime policy. Schulte, however, contended that it had terminated the charging party for referring to his job title as "fucktard" in response to a LinkedIn invitation from a supervisor in the firm's IT department in violation of the firm's electronic communications policy, which prohibited using the firm's electronic communication systems to communicate "obscene, defamatory, harassing or abusive" material to any person or entity associated with the company. (Sorry for the profanity, but I assume you already have clicked on our link to the General Counsel's Advice Memorandum, where the word is used twice.)

In his Advice Memorandum to the Regional Director, the Board's Associate General Counsel recommended dismissal of the charge since there was no way to argue that the charging party's use of that word was concerted protected activity and there apparently was no evidence that the employer had any knowledge of the employee unrest regarding the overtime policy. Consistent with Knauz BMW, the Advice Memorandum concluded that because the employer's policy was not enforced in a manner that restricted the charging party's Section 7 rights, the discharge was valid. Certainly, this portion of the Advice Memorandum is not surprising.

What was a little more unexpected (to me at least), however, was the General Counsel's Office's failure to go ahead and also consider whether the policy itself was overbroad. I mean, this decision comes directly on the heels of the ALJ's decision in Knauz BMW to find a similar policy -- requiring employees to be courteous and polite -- unlawful despite upholding a discharge for Facebook posts based in part on that policy. In Schulte, however, the Advice Memorandum simply states, "In any event, there is no allegation that the rule here is unlawful."

Huh? Don't get me wrong. I'm not looking this gift horse in the mouth, but for those of us looking for some semblance of consistency from the Board on these issues, the General Counsel's position in Schulte is a bit of a head scratcher. Granted, all of these cases are very factually dependent, but this Advice Memorandum not only seems inconsistent with Knauz BMW, it also seems contrary to the position the General Counsel's office took in the initial Facebook firing case, American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., where it alleged that policies prohibiting "disparaging remarks" about the employer violated Section 7 of the NLRA. Again, I welcome this favorable outcome for employers, but going forward, prudent employers should strongly consider including a disclaimer in their social media and electronic communications policies stating that those policies will not be enforced in a manner that would interfere with employees' rights to communicate regarding working conditions. Not a cure-all, for sure, but hopefully it will help the policies withstand NLRB scrutiny until the Board and its counsel's office find some consistency on these issues.

Brian Hall

Update: Legal Challenges to NLRB Posting Rule

We reported recently that motions for summary judgment had been filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the case challenging the NLRB's rule requiring that all employers post a notice about union organizing rights.  Now summary judgment motions have also been filed by both sides in the other case in which the NLRB rule is being challenged. In Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board, et al. (U.S.D.C., South Carolina, Case No. 2:11-cv-02516), the Chamber of Commerce and the NLRB have filed motions with the Court making arguments essentially the same as those made in the D.C. district court case.

The U.S. Chamber did raise one interesting argument not made in the D.C. district court case. The Chamber argued that the NLRB rule requiring employers to post notices about union organizing rights is "forced speech" violating the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Chamber argues that requiring employers to post the notice effectively forces employers to communicate to their employees about labor relations in a manner dictated by the NLRB. In response, the NLRB argues that the notice is not forced speech by the employer, but, rather, is the government communicating to the workforce.

With the current effective date of the posting requirement looming at January 31, 2012, we will keep close watch on further developments in both of these cases.
 

Arguments Begin In Legal Challenges to NLRB Posting Rule

As we reported previously, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") issued a rule in August requiring all employers to post workplace notices about employee rights to join a union. This effort by the NLRB to require posting about union organizing rights in all workplaces has caught the attention of the employer community more than any NLRB action in recent memory. The rule reaches into the workplace of all employers except for those few which are outside of the NLRB's jurisdiction. [See our earlier post that outlines NLRB jurisdiction]. Briefly, if you are wondering if you are covered, you probably are covered. The original effective date for the rule was to have been November 14, 2011, but that effective date was delayed when lawsuits were filed in two federal district courts challenging the NLRB's authority to issue such a rule. The new effective date is January 31, 2012 and the arguments in the lawsuits challenging the posting rule are beginning to take shape.

In a case before the federal District Court for the District of Columbia, all of the parties filed motions for summary judgment on October 26, 2011. (National Ass'n. of Mfrs. v. NLRB, D.D.C., No. 11-CV-1629). In addition to the National Association of Manufacturers, others challenging the NLRB rule in this case include the National Right to Work Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., the Coalition for a Democratic Workplace, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, and several specific employers. The primary arguments being made by those challenging the posting rule include:

  • The NLRB's jurisdiction is limited to specific cases where unions are trying to organize employees (representation cases) and cases where an employer has been charged with committing an unfair labor practice ("ULP"). The law does not allow the NLRB to impose obligations on employers which are not the subject of a representation case or being charged with a ULP. Therefore, the NLRB cannot require all employers to post the notice.
  • The NLRB has exceeded its authority by stating in its rule that the failure to post will be considered a ULP. The NLRB cannot create new ULP's which are not found in the National Labor Relations Act and that law does not include a posting requirement.

The primary arguments made by the NLRB in support of its posting requirement are:

  • The NLRB has authority to enforce employee rights, such as the right to engage in union organizing activity without fear of punishment by their employers. The NLRB argues that "... full and free exercise of NLRA rights depends on employees knowing those rights and that the Board protects those rights."
  • Employees must be made aware of their rights to file ULP charges with the NLRB and of the time deadlines that apply for filing charges.
  • It is appropriate to charge employers with a ULP if they fail to post because employee knowledge of their rights is essential to a full and free exercise of those rights and an employer's intentional refusal to post constitutes interference with employee rights.

The Judge has scheduled oral arguments for December 19, 2011. The other case which challenges the NLRB's right to require posting was filed by the United States Chamber of Commerce and others and is pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. Also, Senator Thune (R-S.D.) has introduced legislation that would block the NLRB's posting rule, but the Senate has not taken any action on that Bill.

We will continue to post future developments that may impact the NLRB's posting rule and the current January 31, 2012 effective date.
 

NLRB Posting Requirement Delay - New Date - January 31, 2012

We reported earlier about the NLRB notice-posting rule, which was to take effect on November 14, 2011. The rule applies to all companies subject to NLRB jurisdiction. (See discussion below of NLRB jurisdiction.) The rule requires companies to post in the workplace notices to employees about their rights to join a union. Not surprisingly, the proposed rule has generated a great deal of attention and some controversy. Recently, we reported on the first lawsuit, filed by the National Association of Manufacturers, to challenge the NLRB's right to impose this rule. Since then, a number of other lawsuits have been filed, including lawsuits filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Right to Work Foundation and the National Federation of Independent Business.

Possibly in response to those lawsuits, the NLRB earlier today issued a notice on its web site saying that the posting requirement is now postponed to January 31, 2012. The Board's stated reason is to allow time for "enhanced education and outreach to employers, particularly those who operate small and medium-sized businesses." Indeed, we have received a number of questions regarding the scope of the posting requirement. For instance, many are asking whether the Board's posting requirement will apply to a particular company or industry. To put it briefly, just about every company in the private sector outside of a few very specific industries is covered by NLRB jurisdiction. For example, certain employers in the railroad, airline, and agricultural industries and federal, state, and local municipal government entities are not covered by the NLRA. Some religious institutions are not covered. But most employers in all other industries are covered.

Another question we are being asked is: "Are there any exemptions for small businesses?" There is no specific exemption from NLRB jurisdiction for a small business. However, to be covered by NLRB jurisdiction, a company has to have enough volume of business to have some impact on interstate commerce. But, the standards for determining that are very broad. For example, in most industries, a company is considered to have an effect on interstate commerce as long as it either sells goods or provides services to out of state customers valued at least $50,000 in a year or purchases goods or services from out of the state valued at at least $50,000 in a year. For some industries, jurisdiction is based on gross annual volume of business The requisite volumes are contained in the Frequently Asked Questions in the Board's postponement announcement under the question: "What if I operate a small business?"

Finally, keep in mind that the Board's posting requirement will apply to all covered businesses regardless of whether they are currently unionized. Therefore, unless it is successfully challenged, the NLRB's posting requirement will apply to all but a very few private sector employers. If the NLRB's posting requirement is upheld, non-unionized employers can expect that their managers and supervisors will begin receiving a questions from their employees about their rights. As a result, non-unionized employers should strongly consider management and supervisory training on how to respond to those questions.
 

NLRB Upholds Facebook Firing but Finds Employer Policies Overbroad

Last week, another ALJ for the National Labor Relations Board issued a decision on a case involving an employee claim that he was unlawfully fired for comments made on a personal Facebook page. Though the ALJ upheld the employee's termination, he also concluded that multiple employer policies were impermissibly over broad.

In Knauz BMW the charging party, a salesman at a BMW dealership, posted two comments regarding his employer on the same day. The first post expressed concerns he had expressed at work regarding the inadequacy of food being served to customers at a sales event and included photos of the event. The second related to an incident that occurred at a sister dealership in which he posted a photo of an accident that occurred when a salesperson apparently left a 13 year old behind the wheel of a vehicle. Both posts were delivered in a sarcastic mocking tone. After a meeting between management and the charging party at which both posts were discussed, the charging party was terminated.

The ALJ first considered whether either or both of these posts were protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. Looking first at the sales event post, the ALJ concluded that the post was protected because the charging party's concerns about the food included concerns that the food would reflect negatively on the dealership and it's sales force and prompt potential customers to purchase another type of luxury vehicle from a dealer that provided more gourmet fare at its sales event. The fact that the post was sarcastic and mocking in the ALJ's opinion did not deprive the post of its protection.

The accident post, however, presented a different situation entirely for the ALJ, who concluded that the charging party posted it "apparently as a lark, without any discussion with any other employee of the Respondent, and had no connection to any of the employees' terms and conditions of employment."

The question then became one of credibility for the ALJ. Did the dealership terminate the charging party due to the protected sales event post, the unprotected accident post, or both? On behalf of the charging party, the Board's General Counsel presented evidence that, at the meeting, the dealership's vice president and general manager crumpled both printed Facebook postings in his hand, tossed them at the charging party and asked, "What were you thinking?" The charging party also testified that at the June 16 meeting, the general manager told him that his posting embarrassed his co-workers and everybody working at BMW, and that another member of management said, “The photos at Land Rover are one thing, but the photos at BMW, that's a whole different ball game.”

On the other hand, dealership witnesses testified that they viewed the sales event post as being "comical" and that the charging party was terminated solely due to the accident post, which was viewed as making fun of as something that could have caused serious injury and damaged the dealership reputation.

Fortunately for the dealership, the ALJ found it's witnesses more credible than the charging party's and therefore upheld his termination.

The ALJ then moved on to consider whether certain company policies were over broad because they would tend to deter employees from discussing their working conditions with each other. The policies at issue were as follows:

  1. Bad Attitude: Employees should display a positive attitude toward their job. A bad attitude creates a difficult working environment and prevents the Dealership from providing quality service to our customers.
  2. Courtesy: Courtesy is the responsibility of every employee. Everyone is expected to be courteous, polite and friendly to our customers, vendors and suppliers, as well as to their fellow employees. No one should be disrespectful or use profanity or any other language which injures the image or reputation of the Dealership.
  3. Unauthorized Interviews: As a means of protecting yourself and the Dealership, no unauthorized interviews are permitted to be conducted by individuals representing themselves as attorneys, peace officers, investigators, reporters, or someone who wants to "ask a few questions." If you are asked questions about the Dealership or its current or former employees, you are to refer that individual(s) to your supervisor. A decision will then be made as to whether that individual may conduct any interview and they will be introduced to you by your supervisor with a reason for the questioning. Similarly, if you are aware that an unauthorized interview is occurring at the Dealership, immediately notify the General Manager or the President.
  4. Outside Inquiries Concerning Employees: All inquiries concerning employees from outside sources should be directed to the Human Resource Department. No information should be given regarding any employee by any other employee or manager to an outside source.

The ALJ considered all but the "Bad Attitude" policy to be over broad. Consistent with what we have seen to date in NLRB General Counsel advice memoranda, the ALJ considered each of the other policies to curtail employee ability to communicate with co- workers, union representatives, lawyers, or Board agents. The ALJ did, however, believe that the dealership had the right to require its employees not to display a bad attitude towards customers.

The dealership had rescinded each of the challenged policies prior to the ALJ hearing so it was necessary for the ALJ to order this remedy. On the other hand, because the offending provisions were rescinded, without a further explanation and without telling the employees that in the future it would not interfere with their Section 7 rights, the ALJ ordered the dealership to post a notice indicating that it would not violate its employees Section 7 rights.

Take Aways for Employers

  1. Understand that the NLRB General Counsel's Office and ALJ's will make very extended logical connections to find Facebook postings to be protected activity. Therefore, before firing employees for what they say on Facebook, consult with your labor and employment counsel to determine whether there is any work-connectedness that might prompt a finding of protected, concerted activity and make sure that the postings truly are damaging to business before pulling the trigger.
  2. Do not leave it to an ALJ to make credibility determinations on the real reason for termination. Document the lawful reasons for termination.
  3. Note that the policies at issue here were not specifically designated as social media policies. Nevertheless, the NLRB will address the legality of any policy that the employer applies in a social media context to determine whether, in its opinion, the policy impermissibly tramples on worker rights.

NLRB Takes Another Big Step to Make Union Organizing Easier

We have reported in recent months about steps that the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") has been taking that will make it far more easy for a Union to win and keep the right to represent a group of workers. The most recent NLRB decision to support union organizing rights opens the door for unions to target a smaller group of employees at a workplace, rather than having to organize a larger group of workers. This will make it much easier for a union to "cherry-pick" a group of workers, gain a foothold, and then try to expand from there to other groups in the same company.

To appreciate how important this can be, consider this example. Presume a union is interested in organizing the workers at a manufacturing plant where there are 300 hourly-paid production and maintenance workers. To get representation rights, the union has to target and gain support among a proper group of workers and then win a secret ballot election. But what group of workers? Is it all 300 production and maintenance workers? Until the NLRB's most recent decision on the topic, that would have been the group that the union would typically have had to try to organize. Now, presume that in this hypothetical manufacturing plant, there is substantial dissatisfaction for one reason or another among the 40 employees in the maintenance department, but not so among the rest of the workers. The union would have a much better chance at gaining enough support to win an election among just that group of 40. Now they can target that group, hope to win the right to represent them, and then begin a plan to expand later to organize other groups in the same workplace.

In Specialty Healthcare & Rehab Ctr., 357 NLRB No. 83, the Board had to decide the appropriate group of employees for the United Steelworkers Union to target at a non-acute care nursing facility. The Union targeted the 53 certified nursing assistants (CNA's). The Employer argued that the only appropriate group for a union representation vote would have to include 33 additional non-professional service and maintenance employees. Under long-standing NLRB precedent for determining what group of employees share a sufficient community of interest to be in a voting group, the Employer argument would have carried the day. As it has done in other ways in recent months, the NLRB used this case to change its approach and give organized labor another tool for organizing. The NLRB held that the United Steelworkers could attempt to organize just the CNA's. Most important, the NLRB announced a new approach to cases like this, shifting to employers a heavy burden when they want to argue that a union should have to target a larger group. All a union has to do now is show that the group they target is a "readily identifiable" group, based on a list of factors including job classifications. If the employer argues that there are additional employees appropriate for the organizing effort, the employer will have a burden to show that the employees in the larger group "share an overwhelming community of interest" with the group being targeted by the union.

In his dissenting opinion, NLRB Member Hayes concludes that the majority decided the case the way they did for the purpose of "reversing the decades-old decline in union density in the private American workforce" and to "encourage unions to engage in incremental organizing in the smallest units possible."

If you are keeping a scorecard on NLRB efforts to support union organizing, consider each of the following things that have occurred recently:

  • Mandatory posting in all workplaces effective November 14, 2011 advising employees of their right to engage in union organizing.
  • The Specialty Healthcare case described above, giving unions the opportunity to target small groups of employees for organizing.
  • A currently pending proposal to significantly shorten the period of time between when a union petitions for an election and when the election occurs, making it very difficult for employers to effectively communicate their position before the election.
  • Administrative action by the NLRB to call for stiffer penalties of employers found to have engaged in unfair labor practices to combat organizing.
  • A series of cases strengthening the protection of unions to continue to represent employees after a business is purchased or after an employer voluntarily recognizes the union without an election.

We will follow closely further developments on the Board's proposed rules to shorten the period before representation elections. An employer facing a potential union election among a small group of employees in a short period of time will face an especially difficult challenge.
 

UPDATE: NLRB Releases Union Organizing Rights Poster on Website; Challenges to Rule Begin

As we noted last month, most private sector employers -- regardless of whether they are unionized -- will be required, beginning November 14, 2011, to post a notice advising employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. Copies of the poster are now available for downloading and printing on the NLRB website here.

But, don't put that poster up a second before you have to. A lawsuit filed by the National Association of Manufacturers against the Board seeks to enjoin enforcement of the rule on the ground that it exceeds the Board's statutory authority. We will keep you posted on any new developments relating to this new rule.

First "Facebook Firing" Case Decided by NLRB Administrative Law Judge

Earlier this year, speculation and educated guesses gave way to NLRB General Counsel Advice Memoranda on how the NLRB will address unfair labor practice charges challenging so-called Facebook firing cases. Now we have our first charge that actually has gone to hearing and resulted in an Administrative Law Judge decision.

In Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., the employer, a not-for-profit corporation that renders social services to economically deprived residents of Buffalo, New York, terminated five employees for their comments on Facebook after a co-worker had raised concerns about the job performance of other HUB employees. Apparently concerned that the co-worker would bring her concerns to management, one of the five employees posted the following on her Facebook page:

[Co-worker] feels that we don't help our clients enough at HUB I about had it!
My fellow coworkers how do u feel?

Thereafter, the others followed with comments suggesting how difficult their jobs actually were. The co-worker mentioned in the posts complained to management about the Facebook posts. The manager then met with each of the employees that posted on Facebook and terminated them.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the Facebook "communications … in reaction to a co-worker's criticisms of the manner in which HUB employees performed their jobs are protected" under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). According to the ALJ, the terminated employees were "taking a first step towards taking group action to defend themselves against the accusations they could reasonably believe [the co-worker] was going to make to management." By discharging the employees, the ALJ concluded, the employer prevented them from taking further action. In short, the ALJ stated,

"Employees have a protected right to discuss matters affecting their employment amongst themselves. Explicit or implicit criticism by a co-worker of the manner in which they are performing their jobs is a subject about which employee discussion is protected by Section 7."

The ALJ went on to hold that the terminated employees did nothing to forfeit the protections of the NLRA. There was no evidence that the terminated employees violated any employer policies or rules. The Facebook posts were not made at work or during working hours and the postings contained no abusive "outbursts" that overrode the right to protection under the NLRA.

Though employers should recognize that this decision is only the decision of a single ALJ and not a decision of the entire Board, the decision does follow naturally from the Advice Memoranda that recently have been generated by the Board's General Counsel's Office. Employers should continue to use caution before taking disciplinary action against employees for what they post on their social media sites when those posts relate to the terms and conditions of their employment. As we have noted in the past, posts that do not implicate working conditions and reflect more of a personal gripe as opposed to an effort to enlist co-worker assistance will be less likely to garner protection from the Board.
 

Unions Get Another Boost From NLRB

Once a union has established majority support among a group of employees, the union's right to represent those employees continues as long as the majority support continues. Employees can demonstrate they no longer want a union to represent them in a variety of ways. They can file a decertification petition with the NLRB to have an election conducted to see if the union still has majority support. Also, if a majority of the represented employees demonstrate clearly that they no longer want the union to represent them, such as by signing an uncoerced petition that was not initiated or supported by the employer, then the employer might be justified in no longer recognizing the union.

However, certain presumptions exist that protect a union for specified periods of time from any attack on their majority status. For example, the typical method by which unions establish majority support is in an NLRB-conducted certification election. If the union wins the election, the union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority support for one year from the date the election results are certified. Also, if a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") is signed between the employer and the union, the union enjoys a presumption of continued majority support for the length of the collective bargaining agreement, up to a maximum of three years. In two recent decisions, the NLRB reversed existing law in a way to give unions even greater protections from challenges to their majority support.

In UGL-UNICCO Service Company (NLRB Case 1-RC-22447), the Board considered how long a union should have a presumption of majority status when the company whose employees they represent is purchased by a new owner. Under certain circumstances, the purchaser of a business becomes a "successor" to the bargaining relationship and must recognize and bargain with the union. The successor does not always have to adopt the existing CBA and, in many cases, has the right to establish its own initial terms and conditions of employment and then bargain with the union for a new CBA. In UGL-UNICCO, the NLRB considered whether the union should enjoy any period of presumed majority support in a successorship situation.

The NLRB reversed existing law established in 2002, which was that in a successorship situation, the union enjoys only a rebuttable presumption of majority support. Under the old law, clear evidence that the union no longer had majority support justified the successor employer refusing to recognize and bargain further with the union. The UGL-UNICCO decision reverses that precedent and re-establishes a "successor bar" doctrine which gives the union in a successorship situation an irrebuttable presumption of majority support for a specified period of time. The union will be presumed to have continued majority support for "a minimum of six months and a maximum of one year, measured from the date of the first bargaining meeting between the union and the [successor] employer." In situations where the successor employer chooses to continue the existing terms and conditions of employment as the starting point for bargaining, the presumed majority support will be for six months. In situations where the successor employer exercises its right to reject existing terms and conditions and implement its own initial terms and conditions while bargaining proceeds, the presumed period of majority support will be no less than six months and no more than one year.

To determine in those cases when the presumption of majority support elapses between six months and one year, the Board will consider:

  • the complexity of the issues being negotiated; the time elapsed since bargaining began and the number of bargaining sessions;
  • the amount of progress made in the negotiations and how near the parties are to concluding an agreement; and
  • whether the parties are at impasse.

With this decision, unions will enjoy a longer period of time of protection against any effort to unseat them due to a lack of majority support after a new owner buys the business.

In another decision issued the same day, the NLRB strengthened the presumption of union majority support in cases where there has been a voluntary recognition of the union. An employer has the right to recognize a union as a majority representative of a group of employees even without an NLRB election if the union has presented evidence of uncoerced majority support, such as a petition or authorization cards signed by a majority of employees. Few employers agree to voluntary recognition based on signed petitions or cards. Most invoke their right to insist instead that the union pursue a secret ballot election conducted by the NLRB. Nevertheless, voluntary recognition sometimes occurs. In 2007, the Bush NLRB ruled in Dana Corp., 351 NLRB 434 (2007) that when an employer extends voluntary recognition, for a period of 45 days, the employees must be given the opportunity to challenge the majority support by a 30% showing of interest in a petition for an NLRB-conducted election.

In Lamons Gasket Company (NLRB Case 16-RD-1597), the Board reversed Dana Corp. Specifically, under Lamons Gasket Company, after voluntary recognition by an employer, a union enjoys a presumption of continued majority support for a "reasonable period of time." What is a "reasonable period of time"? Not surprisingly, the Lamons Gasket Company decision applies the very same standard adopted in UGL-UNICCO. Therefore, when an employer voluntarily recognizes a union, the union will enjoy a presumption of continued majority status for no less than six months and no more than a year, measured by the same principles described above from the UGL-UNICCO case.
 

NLRB Issues Final Rule Requiring All Employers to Post Notice About Union Organizing Rights

On December 27, we wrote a blog post regarding the NLRB proposed rule-making to require all employers to post notices advising employees of their rights to engage in union organizing. After a period of public comment, during which about 7,000 responses were submitted to the NLRB, the NLRB has now issued its final rule requiring the posting.

Effective November 14, 2011, all private sector companies covered by the National Labor Relations Act are required to post in the workplace a specific notice advising employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act to engage in union organizing, to bargain through a union with their employers, and to refrain from those activities. The notice also gives examples of employer and union conduct which is considered illegal and tells employees of actions they can file with the NLRB to enforce their rights. Here is a link to the NLRB announcement, which includes a copy of the required posting (as an Appendix.)  The NLRB promises that by November 1st, the posting will be available for downloading from the NLRB web site and that hard copies will be available from NLRB Regional Offices. All employers will be required to post the notices in conspicuous areas of the workplace where other employment notices are posted. Also, employers that routinely post notices regarding personnel rules or policies on an Internet or intra-net site will be required to post the new NLRB notice on those sites. However, employers are not required to distribute the notice to employees by email or other technological means. In workplaces where at least 20% of the workforce are not proficient in the English language, translated copies must be posted. The NLRB has indicated they will make copies available in various languages.

There are various possible consequences if an employer fails to post the required notice. A failure to post could result in an extension of the normal six-month statute of limitations for filing an unfair labor practice charge. In other words, if an employer has failed to post the notice, the employer might lose the opportunity to have a charge dismissed based on the regular six-month time limit to file a charge. Second, if an employer fails to post the notice, the NLRB has indicated it might take that into consideration as evidence of an employer's motive against unionization. That could be a relevant fact in an unfair labor practice charge, such as if an employee were claiming that he or she had been fired because of union activity.

Employers should recognize the potential impact of this notice. At a minimum, the notice places the rights to union organizing very prominently in front of employees who perhaps have not thought of the issue on their own. The notice certainly increases the possibility for interest in union organizing and make employees aware of specific employer conduct that is illegal, increasing the possibility of unfair labor practice charges. Between now and the November 14 required posting date, employers should consider their overall measures for staying union-free. Are workplace policies, benefits, and management/supervisor behavior of the sort that employees are less likely to feel a need for union representation? Have supervisors been made aware of the critical role that they play in providing a workplace where employees will be less likely to feel a need for union representation? Are supervisors aware of the proper, legal way to respond if union organizing activity does happen? Now is an opportune time for companies to re-examine their commitment to these things and establish or continue best measures for union avoidance.

NLRB's Acting General Counsel Issues Report on Social Media Cases

As you have probably noticed, the interaction between social media and federal labor law has been one of this blog's favorite topics, which we have addressed on multiple occasions. On August 18, 2011, the National Labor Relations Board's Acting General Counsel ("AGC") issued a report that summarizes the General Counsel's Office's view on a variety of cases in which Regional Directors sought advice on social media issues and therefore provides excellent guidance to employers. With one exception, the topics addressed in the Report fall into two broad categories:

  1. First, the Report addresses when an employee's social media activity is protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), which may not be restricted by the employer.
     
  2. Second, the Report addresses the extent to which employers' social media policies in general are so overly broad that they could be reasonably construed to prohibit employee rights to engage in concerted activity. The one exception addressed the question of union coercion of employees of a non-union employer. In that case, the union attempted to coerce the employees by making them believe that they were in danger of being deported for immigration violations. The union videotaped these interrogations and then posted edited versions on Youtube and Facebook. The AGC concluded that the threats and videotaping themselves violated the employees rights to refrain from union activity and that the postings on Youtube and Facebook unlawfully conveyed the same coercive message to any employees who may have viewed them.

The remainder of the AGC's Report addressed the more common issues that we have been discussing in recent months. With respect to the discipline line of cases, the AGC's Report seems to confirm that employee social media posts that are related to terms and conditions of employment and that can be reasonably be interpreted as acting with or on behalf of other employees will be protected, regardless of any otherwise offensive content. Those posts that lack a sufficient connection to work conditions and/or are more personal gripes than common employee issues likely will find no protection under the NLRA.

The AGC Report also extensively discusses the permissible scope of employer social media policies. Read literally, the Report would gut most employer policies as it found general prohibitions against the following provisions to be overbroad:

  • Any communication or post that constitutes embarrassment, harassment or defamation of the employer or any employee, officer, board member, representative, or staff member;
  • Any statements that lack truthfulness or that might damage the reputation or goodwill of the employer, its staff, or employees;
  • Talk about company business, anything that the employee would not want their manager or supervisor to see or that would put their job in jeopardy,
  • Disclosing inappropriate or sensitive information about the employer;
  • Posting pictures or comments involving the company or its employees that could be construed as inappropriate;
  • Use of the company name, address, or other information on social media site personal profiles;
  • Revealing, including through the use of photographs, personal information regarding coworkers, company clients, partners, or customers without their consent; and
  • Using the employer's logos and photographs of the employer's store, brand, or product, without written authorization.

Despite its conclusions, the AGC Report does suggest that narrower prohibitions that provide definition to or examples of prohibited conduct that disclaim any intent to limit an employee's right to engage in concerted activity would be lawful.
 

NLRB General Counsel Recommends Dismissal of Three Charges Contesting Discipline for Facebook Comments, Finding No Concerted Activity

On July 7 and 19, 2011, the NLRB's Office of the General Counsel issued a series of three advice memoranda recommending the dismissal of unfair labor practice charges filed by employees who were disciplined for comments made on Facebook. In each of these charges, the employee alleged that their discipline violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, but in each the NLRB's General Counsel's Office concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the employee engaged in concerted activity.

In the first Memorandum, JT's Porch Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., the employee was a bartender who took issue with and complained to another bartender about the employer's tip policy. Several months later he engaged in a conversation on Facebook with a family member who had asked how his night at work went. He responded with a variety of complaints about not having had a raise and the tip policy. He also called the bar's customer's "rednecks" and said that he hoped they "choked on glass as they drove home drunk." He didn't discuss this posting with any of his co-workers either before or after posting it. Not surprisingly, when one of the managers discovered the post, he was fired. The NLRB's General Counsel concluded that the Facebook posting did not constitute concerted activity. Although the posting addressed terms and conditions of employment, there was no evidence that the posting was a "logical outgrowth of concerns expressed by the employees collectively." Instead, the charging party's comment was in response to a family member's innocuous question about how his night of work had gone. The Memorandum also noted that there had been no efforts to initiate group action over the tipping policy or the lack of raises and no effort to make these complaints known to management. Interestingly, the Memorandum does not address -- because it did not need to -- whether the comments about the bars customers might have separately supported the charging party's discipline.

The second Memorandum, Martin House, in my mind addressed an even simpler set of facts. In this charge, the employer was a non-profit residential facility for homeless people, many of whom suffer from mental illness and substance abuse. While at work, the charging party engaged in a Facebook conversation with two friends, neither of whom were co-workers. In the conversation, she made fun of and was insensitive to the circumstances of the employer's client base. A former client of the facility, who was a "friend" of the charging party on Facebook, saw the charging party's comments and called the employer to report her concerns. As a result, the charging party was fired. Again, the General Counsel's office found no concerted activity. Similar to the facts in JT's Porch Saloon, the charging party was merely communicating with personal friends about what was happening at work. The charging party did not discuss her posts with co-workers and none of her co-workers responded to her posts. In fact, the charging party's comments here were even further removed from work because there was no discussion of the terms and conditions of her employment.

Finally, in Wal-Mart, after an interaction with an assistant manager regarding misplaced and/or mispriced products, the charging party wrote "Wuck Fal-Mart" on her Facebook page. After a couple of co-workers responded, the charging party then began a profane rant about the incident that gave rise to her original post. The charging party also said that two other co-workers expressed support for him. After another co-worker brought the post to management's attention, the charging party was disciplined, but not terminated. The General Counsel's Office again concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the charging party had engaged in concerted activity. Instead, he noted that the charging party's Facebook postings were simply an expression of an individual gripe. "They contain no language suggesting the charging party sought to initiate or induce co-workers to engage in group action; rather they express only his frustration regarding his individual dispute" with the assistant manager. The General Counsel's then went on to analyze the responses to the charging party's postings, which suggested that two of the co-workers found the charging party's initial posting amusing. The third co-worker admitted telling the charging party to "hang in there." The General Counsel's Office interpreted this remark as merely showing that she viewed the postings as a plea for emotional support.

Little by little, the Board is providing employers with guidance on how to address disciplinary issues relating to Facebook postings. It seems clear from these three Memoranda that the Board should seek dismissal of any charge that does not show that the charging party's Facebook postings demonstrate that he or she:

  • is acting with or on the authority of other employees;
  • is seeking to initiate, induce, or prepare for group action;
  • is bringing truly group complaints to the attention of management.

On the other hand, comments made solely by and on behalf of the employee him or herself are not concerted. In this regard, however, it is clear that the Board will look to any co-worker responses to see whether they interpreted the charging party's statements as being individual gripes or an effort at concerted activity. Finally, it is clear that the Board will also look to whether the Facebook comments are a logical outgrowth of concerns expressed by employees collective. Therefore, employers contemplating discipline of an employee for social media comments must take all of the circumstances into consideration and cannot focus solely on the employee's comment in a vacuum.

(Hat tip to Labor Relations Today Blog)
 

Obama Administration Issues Two Proposed Regulations Designed to Promote Pro-Union Agenda

It's only Wednesday and already this is proving to be a potentially huge week for organized labor. In moves long sought by organized labor and opposed by business groups, the Obama Administration issued two proposed federal regulations this week that could significantly impact union elections.

First, on Monday, The Department of Labor ("DOL") issued a proposed regulation that would require employers to disclose more information about consultants they hire in response to union organizing campaigns. According to the DOL, the Labor-Management Reporting Disclosure Act which was enacted in 1959 currently is being applied too narrowly, because it only requires reporting of consultants who communicate directly with employees. Under the DOL's proposed new expanded definition of "advice," an employer would be required to report any arrangements with consultants who issue communications on behalf of the employer designed to "directly or indirectly" persuade workers concerning their rights to organize or bargain collectively. Under the proposed new rule, indirect persuasion could be construed so broadly as to require disclosures of attendance at "union avoidance" seminars and conferences offered to employers by lawyers or labor consultants. The proposed regulation is open for public comment until August 22, and the DOL will then decide whether to make the new rule official.

In the second, bigger coup for organized labor this week, the NLRB yesterday issued proposed regulations that are intended to substantially shorten the time period between when a union files a petition for a union election and the time the election is held. The proposed "quickie elections" regulation, as they are referred to by the lone Republican Board Member Hayes, would give unions an advantage in organizing by giving management less time to respond to a union campaign. If adopted after a public notice-and-comment process, the proposed rules would include changes in the union election process such as:

  • Allowing for electronic filing of election petitions and other documents
  • Requiring parties to identify issues and describe evidence soon after an election is filed to facilitate resolution and eliminate unnecessary litigation
  • Deferring litigation of most voter eligibility issues until after the election
  • Requiring the employer to provide a final voter list in electronic form soon after the scheduling of an election, including voters' phone numbers and email addresses when available
  • Making Board review of post-election decision discretionary, rather than mandatory

Currently, the median time between when a union files a petition and when an election is held is 38 days. The NLRB says it cannot calculate how much shorter the time could be under the new rules. However, dissenting Member Hayes predicts that elections would be held within 10 to 21 days after the petition's filing. "Make no mistake, the principal purpose for this radical manipulation of our election process is to minimize, or rather, to effectively eviscerate an employer's legitimate opportunity to express its views about collective bargaining," Member Hayes wrote.

The DOL's and NLRB's proposed regulations are sure to be the center of heated debates between organized labor and business groups during the next 60 days. Given the Obama Administration's distinctly pro-labor bent, however, the debate will likely fall on deaf ears.

NLRB Befriends Unions Again, and Again

No, this is not another comment on the much-publicized and highly politicized complaint filed by the National Labor Relations Board ("Board" or "NLRB") against Boeing for allegedly moving work from Washington to South Carolina in retaliation for protected union activity. Rather, it pertains to Sheet Metal Workers Local 15 (Brandon Medical Center) and Auto Workers Local 376 (Colt's Mfg. Co.), decisions issued by the Board on May 26 and May 27, 2011, respectively.

Although these cases involved entirely different fact situations, in each instance a panel of the NLRB rejected findings of an administrative law judge who, after hearing the evidence, concluded that a union had violated the National Labor Relations Act("NLRA" or "Act"). Both panels included Members Liebman and Pearce, while Member Hayes dissented in both cases.

In Sheet Metal Workers the question was whether a 16' x 12' rat balloon with a sign attached to its abdomen along with a union member displaying a leaflet with outstretched arms to incoming and outgoing traffic constituted unlawful picketing under Section 8 (b)(4)(ii)(B) or was simply lawful handbilling.

Based upon the evidence, including the union organizer's admission to the hospital safety and security director that the union was "picketing" and that the rat balloon "would probably get the attention of the public more than just regular handbills," the administrative law judge found this conduct to be unlawful picketing. Expanding upon a 2010 decision which had held that large, stationary banners did not constitute pickets, however, Members Liebman, Pearce and Becker rejected this conclusion. According to them, the giant, sign-holding rat and union supporter "entailed no element of confrontation, as they were stationary and located at sufficient distances (between 100 and 170 feet) from the vehicle and building entrances to the hospital" so "visitors were not confronted by an actual or symbolic barrier as they arrived at, or departed from, hospital."

By contrast, Member Hayes would have upheld the ALJ's determination, reasoning:

"For pedestrians or occupants of cars passing in the shadow of the rat balloon, which proclaims the presence of a 'rat employer' and is surrounded by union agents, the message is unmistakably confrontational and coercive… Such displays, now frequent in labor disputes, constitute a signal to third parties that there is, in essence, an invisible picket line that should not be crossed."

The following day, in Auto Workers, Members Liebman and Pearce again rejected an ALJ's finding that a union had violated the Act; and Member Hayes again disagreed. This time the issue was whether a union could require that employees objecting to union dues being used for activities other than collective-bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustment renew such objection annually.

The ALJ concluded that there was no valid business justification for the annual renewal requirement, especially since the union did not have similar requirements for "union membership cards, dues authorization checkoff cards or notice of resignation from the union" and could not satisfactorily explain such inconsistency. The Board majority, however, concluded that there was no showing that the union's actions were "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith" and therefore "conclude[ed] that the Unions' procedures comport with the duty of fair representation."

Dissenting, Member Hayes would have found the annual renewal requirement to be a substantial and arbitrary burden, as well as discriminatory. Moreover, in addition to upholding the ALJ, he would have addressed whether the standard duty of fair representation standard used by the majority was too deferential when the conduct arguably involved a union's interference with an employee's Section 7 rights.

Although the NLRB undoubtedly tries to apply and interpret the Act correctly, its members each bring a certain perspective to that process. And, while these holdings are limited to somewhat unique facts and narrow legal issues, they provide a warning which all employers should heed: currently the Board majority has a decidedly more pro-union perspective than it did under the previous administration.
 

NLRB'S Office of General Counsel Issues New Advice Memorandum on Social Media

The NLRB’s General Counsel’s Office’s approach to employer social media policies and the discipline of employees pursuant to such policies has been a frequent topic of this blog. In fact, just last month, I called on both the NLRB and employers to take a step back from the rhetoric on this controversial topic. Yesterday, the NLRB’s General Counsel’s Office issued another Advice Memorandum (dated April 21, 2011), which again addresses the social media topic but this time upholds the employer’s discipline of an employee for posting offensive tweets on Twitter. In Lee Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Arizona Daily Star the charging party was the public safety reporter for the Arizona Daily Star newspaper in Tucson. The newspaper had no social media policy, but began urging its reporters to begin using social media, including twitter. In early 2010, the charging party posted a tweet that ridiculed a headline in the newspaper’s sports section. He was called into a meeting with the human resources director, who encouraged him to discuss any concerns he had rather than tweeting about them. About a week later, he met with the managing editor, who “prohibited [him] from airing his grievances or commenting about the Daily Star in any public forum. The charging party then refrained from tweeting about the newspaper itself, but in August and September 2010, he tweeted the following:

  • August 27 - “You stay homicidal, Tucson. See Star Net for the bloody deets."
  • August 30 - “What?!?!? No overnight homicide? WTF? You’re slacking Tucson.”
  • September 10 - “Suggestion for new Tucson-area theme song: Droening [sic] pool’s ‘let the bodies hit the floor’.”
  • September 10 - “I’d root for daily death if it always happened in close proximity to Gus Balon’s.”
  • September 10 - “Hope everyone’s having a good Homicide Friday, as one Tucson police officer called it.”
  • September 14 - “[FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C)].”
  • September 15 - “[FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C)].”
  • September 19 - “My discovery of the Red Zone channel is like an adolescent boy’s discovery of h...let’s just hope I don’t end up going blind.”

Finally, on September 21, Tucson area television news station posted the following tweet on its Twitter feed: “Drug smuggler tries to peddle his way into the U.S.” The Charging Party saw the tweet, reposted it on his Twitter site, and tweeted the following: “Um, I believe that’s PEDAL. Stupid TV people.”

When the television station took issue with this response, the Daily Star’s managing editor again called him into the office and this time told him that his tweets were inappropriate and that he was to refrain from any tweeting until she had had an opportunity to meet with the executive editor and human resources. In prohibiting him from tweeting, the managing editor noted that the charging party’s Twitter screen name and biography referenced that he worked at the Daily Star and had a link to the Daily Star’s website, she considered this to be a work Twitter account, and that he was drawing negative attention to the Daily Star when he made the various tweets about homicides in Tucson. The charging party promptly changed his screen name, deleted some of his supervisors from his list of followers and changed his account settings so that he had to approve anyone before they could view his tweets. Later in September, the charging party was advised of his termination. He also told a couple of co-workers to be careful about what they write on Facebook and Twitter.

The charging party then filed a charge with the NLRB contending that he was disciplined pursuant to an unlawful rule that prohibited certain Section 7 activities. The General Counsel’s office disagreed and recommended that the charge be dismissed. In reaching this conclusion, the General Counsel’s Office noted that The Daily Star did not implement an unlawful rule. Though the General Counsel’s Office acknowledged that “in warning the Charging Party to cease his inappropriate tweets, and then discharging him for continuing to post inappropriate tweets, the Employer made statements that could be interpreted to prohibit activities protected by Section 7, he also noted that those statements did not constitute orally promulgated, overbroad “rules.” Instead, the statements were made solely to the Charging Party in the context of discipline, and in response to specific inappropriate conduct, and were not communicated to any other employees or proclaimed as new “rules.” For example, after the Human Resources Director had met with the Charging Party and warned him to stop making inappropriate comments, and the Charging Party persisted, the Managing Editor called him in and warned him to stop airing his grievances or commenting about the Employer in any public forum. And after the Charging Party persisted in writing his offensive messages, the Managing Editor told him that he was not allowed to tweet about anything work related. Finally, the Charging Party’s termination letter refers to the fact that he was told “to refrain from using derogatory comments in any social media forums that may damage the goodwill of the company.” The General Counsel’s Office stated that “although the statements arguably constituted unlawful restrictions on the Charging Party’s own Section 7 activities, it would not effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act to issue a complaint where the statements were directed to a single employee who was lawfully discharged.”

With respect to the actual discipline and termination of the charging party, the Advice Memorandum states:

We have found no case in which the Board held discipline pursuant to an unlawful rule to be unlawful where the underlying conduct was itself unrelated to protected, concerted activity. In this case, even if the Employer implemented an unlawful rule, the Charging Party was terminated for posting inappropriate and unprofessional tweets, after having been warned not to do so, i.e. for engaging in misconduct. The Charging Party’s conduct was not protected and concerted: it did not relate to the terms and conditions of his employment or seek to involve other employees in issues related to employment. Specifically, after opening a Twitter account and linking it to the Employer’s website, the Charging Party began tweeting inappropriate comments. The Employer warned the Charging Party that his comments were inappropriate, but he ignored the warning and continued to post additional inappropriate tweets while covering his beat as a public safety reporter. Those tweets included: “What?!?!?! No overnight homicide? WTF? You’re slacking Tucson” and “[Exemptions 6 and 7(C)].” The Charging Party’s discharge did not violate the Act
because he was discharged for this misconduct, which did not involve protected activity.

The NLRB’s General Counsel’s Advice Memorandum in Lee Enterprises injects a bit of fresh air into the social media controversy. Here, the Advice Memorandum correctly puts the employer’s discipline of the employee in a proper context. Clearly, there was no effort on the employee’s part to grieve about working conditions and there was no effort on his part to involve other employees in such a grievance. In addition, the employer in this case certainly had the right to protect its reputation from its employee’s inappropriate tweets. As a result, the Lee Enterprises Advice Memorandum should be viewed as positive news and hopefully is a sign that cooler heads will prevail in this controversy.
 

An Appeal for Cooler Heads on NLRB's Social Media Policy Enforcement

Several days ago, I read the New York Times article reporting that the NLRB's Manhattan Regional Director was threatening to file a complaint against Thomson-Reuters for allegedly reprimanding an employee who had criticized management on Twitter. At the time, I flagged the article because I wanted to use it to highlight my -- emphasis on the word, MY -- views on the NLRB's recent assault on social media policies: When it comes to social media, it is time for cooler heads to prevail, both at the NLRB and within the employer community.

So, what happened at Thomson-Reuters? According to the article in the Times, the company on one of its Twitter outlets had invited employees to post suggestions on Twitter about how to make Reuters the best place to work. In response, an employee, who was also the head of the Newspaper Guild at Reuters, tweeted: "One way to make this the best place to work is to deal honestly with Guild members." The next day, her supervisor contacted her at home to advise her about Reuters policy of not saying things that would damage the company's reputation. Though Reuters denies that it disciplined the employee, she complained that she felt threatened and intimidated. A source at the NLRB apparently confirmed to the Times that it would be filing a complaint against Thomson-Reuters accusing the company of violating the employee's right to engage in concerted, protected activity with co-workers to improve working conditions.

Here we go again... In February, the NLRB's Region 34 settled its complaint against a Connecticut ambulance company for having an allegedly overbroad social media policy and disciplining an employee for criticizing a supervisor. The settlement required the company to revise its policy to "ensure that they do not improperly restrict employees from discussing their wages, hours and working conditions with coworkers and others while not at work.” The employer also agreed that it “would not discipline or discharge employees for engaging in such discussions.”

My initial reaction is that the NLRB is making the proverbial mountain out of a molehill in this case -- but perhaps not before Thomson-Reuters did. While I agree with those who question whether the NLRB is being unnecessarily aggressive in these discipline cases, I also have to believe that Thomson-Reuters is questioning whether its manager's response to this particular tweet was worth the trouble it now is causing. I'm certain that far more people have become aware of this tweet than if they had simply ignored it -- thus exponentially increasing any disparagement Reuters may have felt. This added negative publicity, of course, is separate and apart from whether the tweet really amounts to protected concerted activity under Section 7. So, employers: think twice before reprimanding, disciplining or terminating an employee because his or her tweet hurt your feelings. If there truly is serious damage to the company's reputation either as a result of disloyalty, product disparagement or other acts that are contrary to the company's interests, this is where I believe the NLRB needs to back off. But, based on what I've seen, I don't think that either the AMR case or the Thomson-Reuters case reached this threshold.

On the other hand, I'm hoping that the NLRB's aggressive stance towards social media policies does not suggest an intent to gut the framework that is contained in the December 2009 Advice Memorandum in Sears Holdings. In Sears Holdings, the General Counsel's office announced a reasonable and workable framework for analyzing whether a social media policy was improperly overbroad because it would tend to chill employees' Section 7 activities. The policy at issue in Sears Holdings prohibited employees from, among many other things, disparaging the company's "products, services, executive leadership, employees, strategy, and business prospects." The General Counsel's office advised that this policy would not be considered overbroad because there was no evidence that Sears has used the Policy to discipline any employee for engaging in protected activity, nor that the Policy was promulgated in response to any Section 7 activity. Finally, the General Counsel concluded that, when read in the context of the entire social media policy, no reasonable employee could have construed the non-disparagement provision to prohibit lawful Section 7 activities. In short, the Sears Holdings Advice Memorandum would require consideration of the entire policy in the context under which it was enacted before concluding whether the policy was overbroad.

In my opinion, Sears Holdings provides a reasonable and workable framework for analyzing social media policies and any abandonment of this framework, would be a mistake. But we are at a point where the NLRB's Acting General Counsel should either reaffirm the Sears Holdings framework or provide some additional guidance so that employers will at least know how to tailor their social media policies to avoid the Board's ire. Any additional guidance should continue to permit employers to include non-disparagement provisions in their social media policies, particularly if the policy contains some notice to employees that the policy is not intended to prevent them from discussing terms and conditions of employment.
 

NLRB Continues To Support Harsh Remedies

A recent advice memo from the Acting General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) shows once again that the agency is stepping up the nature of the remedies it will go after when employers are accused of unfair labor practices.

In GC Memo 11-06 the General Counsel authorizes NLRB Regional Offices to seek certain extraordinary remedies where the employer is accused of bad faith bargaining with a union over initial collective bargaining agreement terms. The Regions are now authorized to pursue directly:

  • notice reading (requiring a management representative to read a statement in front of employees saying the company will not violate the National Labor Relations Act);
  • a minimum six-month extension of the certification year (unions enjoy a one-year period of time after they become certified to represent a group of employees during which they cannot lose their representation rights, even if a majority of the employees no longer want them. This remedy allows the NLRB to extend that protection for the union for a minimum of an additional six months. Although the GC Memo states that an extension of 12 months is "normally" best, it allows the Region to seek less time, but no less than six months. Interestingly, no maximum time is set for the extension); and
  • a mandatory schedule for bargaining meetings of no less than 24 hours total per month and no less than six hours per session (the theory for this remedy is that employer's sometimes refuse to meet on a sufficiently frequent basis and/or refuse to provide information needed by the union).

In the past, Regional Offices could pursue these remedies only after asking for approval from the NLRB Division of Advice in Washington. The GC memo also mentions, as additional appropriate remedies, requiring the employer to reimburse the expenses the union incurs in the bargaining process allegedly caused by the employer's misconduct and to reimburse the union for its related litigation expenses. However for those remedies, the Regions must still seek approval from the Division of Advice.

This GC memo is just the most recent in a very clear pattern of actions by the NLRB to strengthen its tools of enforcement in ways that make it easier for unions to organize workers and to obtain first contract terms. These were among the main objectives in the ill-fated Employee Free Choice Act proposed in the early days of the current administration and supported fervently by organized labor. When it became clear there was not sufficient support in Congress for that law to pass, the NLRB began its efforts to support the same objectives through administrative measures like this most recent GC memo.
 

NLRB Continues Aggressive Campaign

As we have been noting recently, the NLRB and its Acting General Counsel (AGC) have embarked on an aggressive campaign to increase NLRB influence and control over labor-management relations. At hearings on Friday, February 11, 2011 before the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, the employer community raised concerns about a number of those initiatives, including two recent AGC Memoranda, which are enforcement directives from the NLRB General Counsel to NLRB Regional Offices around the country. In GC 11-04, the AGC issued a controversial direction to the Regional Offices to include mandatory default language in settlement agreements. In GC 11-05, the AGC announced a significant change in the way the NLRB will proceed when issues brought before the NLRB could also be brought in front of an arbitrator under a labor contract grievance procedure.

Memorandum GC 11-04 instructs the NLRB's Regional Offices to include certain language in all settlement agreements over unfair labor practice charges. The new language says that if an employer fails to comply with any aspect of the settlement, the employer will automatically be deemed to have admitted all of the allegations in the underlying unfair labor practice complaint. This language means that employers entering into settlement agreements with the NLRB will have to be very cautious not to do anything that might be construed a violation of its obligations under the settlement agreement because violating the settlement will make the employer automatically liable for the underlying allegations.

Memorandum GC 11-05 revises the NLRB's long-standing practice of deferring to arbitration awards and grievance settlements. Up until now, if a union that represented an employee covered by a labor contract with a grievance/arbitration procedure filed a charge with the NLRB claiming unfair treatment, the NLRB would usually defer to the grievance arbitration procedure if the conduct complained about could be pursued under those procedures. In Memorandum GC 11-05, the AGC says that the NLRB's current policy is "overly deferential" and does not adequately protect employee rights. The AGC urges Regional Directors to investigate charge allegations and make a decision whether the charge has "arguable merit" before deferring to arbitration. In cases where an arbitration decision has already been issued, the NLRB Regional Directors are told to determine whether the parties presented to the arbitrator the statutory right that the charging party sought to enforce and whether the statutory right was incorporated into the arbitrator's decision. The Regional Director is also to consider whether the arbitrator correctly recognized the statutory principles and applied them in issuing his or her decision. Only then will the Board defer to the arbitrator's award. Also, the AGC urges Regional Directors not to defer to grievance settlements unless it is clear the parties intended for the settlement to resolve the unfair labor practice issues. Regional Directors are also encouraged to consider whether the settlement is "reasonable," whether it appears any fraud, duress, or coercion occurred and whether the respondent has a history of unfair labor practices or of violating settlement agreements.

All of the hurdles set out in Memorandum GC 11-05 will make it far less likely that the NLRB will defer to grievance arbitration procedures. This means that employers with union contracts can expect much more often to be required to battle before the NLRB regarding the very same issues that are being pursued under the union contract grievance arbitration procedures.
 

NLRB's "Facebook Firing" Case Against AMR Settles

Earlier this week, the National Labor Relations Board issued a press release announcing the settlement of the NLRB’s Complaint against American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. (AMR) in what has become known as the Facebook Firing case.

In that complaint, the Board alleged that that AMR maintained an overly broad handbook policy regarding blogging, Internet posting and communications between employees and had unlawfully terminated an employee pursuant to that policy after she had posted critical comments about her supervisor and responded to further comments from her co-workers. The press release notes that, among other things, AMR has agreed to revise its policy to ensure that it does not improperly restrict employees from discussing their wages, hours and working conditions with co-workers and others while not at work and that it would not discipline or discharge employees for engaging in such discussions. The exact details of the required policy revisions are not clear as of this date; nor is it certain that the NLRB will be issuing any further press releases regarding this case. The text of the press release is reprinted below.

PRESS RELEASE

Contact:
Office of Public Affairs
202-273-1991
publicinfo@nlrb.gov
www.nlrb.gov

A settlement has been reached in a case involving the discharge of a Connecticut ambulance service employee for posting negative comments about a supervisor on her Facebook page.
The NLRB’s Hartford regional office issued a complaint against American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., on October 27, 2010, alleging that the discharge violated federal labor law because the employee was engaged in protected activity when she posted the comments about her supervisor, and responded to further comments from her co-workers. Under the National Labor Relations Act, employees may discuss the terms and conditions of their employment with co-workers and others.

The NLRB complaint also alleged that the company maintained overly-broad rules in its employee handbook regarding blogging, Internet posting, and communications between employees, and that it had illegally denied union representation to the employee during an investigatory interview shortly before the employee posted the negative comments on her Facebook page.

Under the terms of the settlement approved today by Hartford Regional Director Jonathan Kreisberg, the company agreed to revise its overly-broad rules to ensure that they do not improperly restrict employees from discussing their wages, hours and working conditions with co-workers and others while not at work, and that they would not discipline or discharge employees for engaging in such discussions.

The company also promised that employee requests for union representation will not be denied in the future and that employees will not be threatened with discipline for requesting union representation. The allegations involving the employee’s discharge were resolved through a separate, private agreement between the employee and the company.

The National Labor Relations Board is an independent federal agency vested with the authority to safeguard employees’ rights to organize and to determine whether to have a union as their collective bargaining representative, and to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices committed by private sector employers and unions.
 

NLRB Creates Pre-emptive Strike Unfair Labor Practice

Over the past few weeks, we have documented the NLRB’s efforts to expand worker rights through rule-making and General Counsel directives. On January 28, 2011, however, the Board went back to its traditional means of fashioning federal labor policy by issuing its decision in Parexel International, LLC., 356 NLRB No. 82 (January 28, 2011).  

In Parexel, the charging party had a conversation with a co-worker about whether he received a wage increase after he had left and then returned to work for the company. He indicated (apparently falsely) that in fact he had received a raise and so did his wife who also had left and returned. The charging party then went to her supervisor, repeated the tale from her co-worker and then suggested that her entire unit should quit and return so they could get raises. The supervisor then told management about the conversation, which resulted in the charging party being summoned to discuss the matter. The charging party reiterated her conversation with the co-worker and stated her belief that the company, which had a significant number of employees from South Africa, was favoring the South Africans when it came to wages. When questioned, the charging party denied having spoken with any of her co-workers regarding her concerns. A few days later, the employee was terminated.

Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it illegal to terminate an employee for engaging in "protected concerted activity." One form of protected concerted activity is to talk to co-workers to raise issues of mutual concern about wages or other working conditions. The NLRB Judge (ALJ) in this case concluded that the company had not violated the National Labor Relations Act because the employee, who had not discussed her concerns with any co-workers, had not yet engaged in any protected activity. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ noted:

In some respects, [the charging party’s] termination was a pre-emptive strike to prevent her from engaging in activity protected by the Act. See Compuware Corp., 320 NLRB 101, 102-103 (1995). However, I have not encountered any precedent for the proposition that I can find a violation on this basis without evidence that the alleged discriminate (sic.) had in fact engaged in concerted protected activity. Therefore, I decline to affirm the complaint on this basis.

On appeal, a three-member panel of the NLRB, however, disagreed, adopting a “pre-emptive strike” theory that expands the scope of protected activity for employees by rejecting any requirement that actual concerted activity take place prior to finding a Section 8(a)(1) violation. Specifically, the Board stated, “If an employer acts to prevent concerted protected activity – to 'nip it in the bud' – that action interferes with and restrains the exercise of Section 7 rights and is unlawful without more.” “What is critical,” the Board concluded, was “the employer’s intent to suppress protected concerted activity.” On the specific facts of this case, the Board noted:

[The charging party’s] discharge had the obvious effect of restricting her own further protected discussions of wages and possible discrimination with other employees, thus interfering with her Section 7 rights. As discussed above, the discharge also had the effect of keeping other employees in the dark about these matters, thus preventing them from discussing, and possibly inquiring further or acting in response to, substandard wages or perceived wage discrimination. We therefore find that the Respondent’s discharge of [the charging party] violated Section 8(a)(1).

Non-unionized employers frequently lose track of the fact that employees’ Section 7 rights under the NLRA include the right to discuss their wages with each other and that the right extends to non-union as well as union workers. Many non-union employers, however, still enforce policies, often unwritten, that forbid or at least discourage employees from comparing wage information with each other. On this count, the Board noted:

[W]e have often found that maintenance or enforcement of a rule against discussing wages effectively interferes with employee rights and violates Section 8(a)(1) even if no employee has yet engaged in protected activity and been disciplined under the rule … If maintenance of such a rule violates the Act, a fortiori, the discharge of an employee to prevent her from engaging in such conduct violates the Act. When an employee is discharged on that basis, both she and the employees with whom she would have spoken are denied the opportunity to compare their wages and other terms of employment and to determine whether to take further concerted action.

The Board’s Parexel decision unmistakably provides yet another shot in the arm to union organizing efforts. In fact, the Board noted the significance of wage discussions to unionization by stating:

The Board has long held that Section 7 ‘encompasses the right of employees to ascertain what wages are paid by their employer, as wages are a vital term and condition of employment.’ In fact, wage discussions among employees are considered to be at the core of Section 7 rights because wages, ‘probably the most critical element in employment,' are the ‘grist on which concerted activity feeds.’ Discussions about wages are often the precursor to organizing and seeking union assistance. But whether such discussions lead to union activity or not, our precedents provide that restrictions on wage discussions are violations of Section 8(a)(1) (Citations omitted.)

Employers, whether unionized or not, therefore should understand that their motivation in chilling concerted activity, not whether actual concerted activity has already taken place, will determine whether Section 8(a)(1) has been violated. Employers can also be sure that unions will be using the Parexel decision to their advantage to encourage employee discussions about wages and other terms and conditions of employment in order to potentially spark union interest.

In the next few days, we will address other recent NLRB pronouncements that have been somewhat lost in the shuffle, but nevertheless could have significant impact on federal labor policy. Stay tuned…
 

Sixth Circuit Holds That Ohio Wrongful Termination Claim Pre-Empted By NLRA

In a decision issued this morning, the Sixth Circuit held that an Ohio complaint alleging wrongful termination for discharging employees for unionizing activities was pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).  Specifically, the court in Lewis v. Whirlpool Corporation upheld the dismissal of the case by the district court based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   

The plaintiff argued that because he had been employed as a supervisor, he was not an employee covered by the NLRA. The court noted, however, that a supervisor has a viable claim under the NLRA when he is terminated or otherwise disciplined for refusing to commit unfair labor practices. In addition, it appears that Lewis filed a charge with the NLRB, but withdrew it when it became clear that an NLRB Field Examiner had concluded that his claim had no merit. Because Lewis’s claim under Ohio law was identical to the claim he could (and, in fact, did) bring before the NLRB, the Ohio law claim was pre-empted and subject to dismissal. 

Although the court did not have to address the issue in light of its pre-emption finding, it seems that the availability of adequate remedies for Lewis under the National Labor Relations Act (had he been able to factually support his claims) would have resulted in dismissal of his Ohio wrongful termination claim in any event. Keep in mind, however, that on that front, we are still awaiting the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., which we expect will again address the scope of Ohio public policy wrongful termination law in the context of a workers’ compensation retaliation claim.

NLRB Seems Determined to Make Union Organizing More Easy

As expected, the NLRB has moved forward with initiatives that seem designed to make it easier for unions to successfully organize. The most controversial aspects of the proposed Employee Free Choice Act, including card-check recognition and mandatory arbitration in bargaining, seem to be dead in the water. But a union-friendly NLRB is pursuing initiatives administratively that will facilitate union organizing. 

Rule Making to Require Posting About Organizing Rights

The NLRB recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making which would require all employers to post notices in the workplace advising employees of their rights to engage in union organizing. The notice would have to be posted prominently in the workplace and employers that communicate electronically with employees would be required to include the posting in an electronic communication The proposed mandatory organizing poster is very similar to one that is required for federal contractors and subcontractors. It gives a comprehensive explanation of employee rights to organize and restrictions on employer responses to organizing. 

 

A copy of the NLRB news release about the proposed rule, together with links to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making, which includes the full text of the proposed posting, and additional information, can be found here

 

The prospect of a mandatory prominent notice about union organizing in the workplace is good cause for every employer to evaluate its overall plan for response to possible union activity.

 

General Counsel Memo About Extraordinary Remedies During Union Organizing

When union organizing does occur an employer has the right to communicate its position about union organizing and to continue to run its business appropriately. However, an employer does not have the right to engage in improper interference with employee organizing. Sometimes in the middle of an organizing campaign and before the election happens an employer is accused of discriminatory treatment such as a discriminatory discharge or other illegal conduct. Of course, the employer has the right to make its defense and often the legal dispute is not resolved until after the election occurs. In some cases, the NLRB goes to federal court and asks for an injunction to get some sort of temporary relief before the election occurs. The idea is that some kinds of employer illegal conduct could have a damaging effect on the rights of the employees to exercise their free choice in the election and that some sort of interim relief may be necessary to offset that potential damaging effect.

 

Earlier this year the top attorney for the NLRB (the General Counsel) issued a directive to all NLRB regional offices stating that any time any employee is discharged during organizing and a charge is filed claiming that the discharge was for anti-union reasons, the NLRB should pursue an injunction requiring that the employee be reinstated to employment until the case has been fully decided by the NLRB. This sort of extraordinary temporary relief, called a 10(j) injunction, in the past has been one pursued only in unusual cases. However, today's NLRB is determined more than ever to deal aggressively with what it considers to be improper employer conduct.

 

In a memo issued on December 20, 2010 the General Counsel now has directed regions to pursue other kinds of interim relief when a discriminatory discharge is alleged. and the employer is also accused of other kinds of improper conduct during the election campaign, such as interrogating employees, promising benefits or improperly restricting employee communication about the organizing. The remedies that the General Counsel suggests should be pursued are truly extraordinary. For example, the memo suggests that the NLRB ask the federal court to require a top management official, such as the president of a company, to personally read a notice to employees explaining to them their rights to engage in organizing. The theory is that while it is being determined whether the employer violated the law at all, any potential impact on voting employees will be offset if a top management official stands in front of them and reads to them their rights concerning organizing. Similarly, the board suggests that in some cases it might be appropriate to require that outside union organizers have access to employee bulletin boards. The memo goes so far as to suggest that in some cases it might be necessary to request that outside union organizers be granted access to the employer property to conduct meetings with employees.

 

These are very controversial measures because they would be required before there has been any finding that the employer engaged in any illegal conduct. In fact, the possibility of this sort of interim relief might actually be an inducement to unions to file charges in the hope of getting a significant boost in the organizing effort. Of course, an employer will have the opportunity to argue in federal court against the injunctive relief.

NLRB Issues Complaint In Facebook Firing Case

On November 2, 2010, the NLRB issued a press release reporting that its Hartford, Connecticut, regional office had issued a Complaint alleging that American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., (“AMR”) had published an overly broad blogging and Internet posting policy that violated employee Section 7 rights, and then illegally fired an employee for negative posts about a supervisor.

As described in the Complaint, the AMR policy prohibited employees from making disparaging remarks when discussing the company or supervisors and from depicting the company “in any way” over the Internet without company permission. Such provisions, according to the NLRB’s Complaint, constitute a violation of 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act because they interfere with employees' right to engage in protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA. (The NLRB and courts typically interpret Section 7 as protecting employees’ right to discuss the terms and conditions of their employment with other employees or even non-employees.)  The NLRB also alleged that the employer illegally fired an employee pursuant to that policy for posting negative remarks about a supervisor on Facebook, which the NLRB said drew supportive remarks from her co-workers.

 

Back in December 2009, the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel issued an Advice Memorandum that addressed the circumstances under which an employer’s social media policy might violate Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because it might chill employee participation in concerted activities. Though the Memorandum does not constitute binding precedent, the General Counsel’s office concluded that the policy at issue, published by Sears Holdings, did not violate Section 8(a)(1) because, read as a whole, the policy could not be reasonably viewed by an employee as chilling union activity. The disputed provision in the policy prohibited “Disparagement of company’s or competitors’ products, services, executive leadership, employees, strategy, and business prospects.” The prohibition against disparaging the company, while perhaps read by itself might tend to discourage employees from engaging in concerted activity, was included among several other provisions that clearly did not violate Section 8(a)(1).  In addition, there was no evidence that the employer has used the policy to discipline any employee for engaging in protected activity, nor that the Policy was promulgated in response to any other concerted or union activity.

It is in this context that the NLRB likely will evaluate the AMR policy and termination.  Keep in mind that the issuance of this Complaint is not a final decision of the NLRB.  It is the first step in the processes that might lead to a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and a decision. As a result, if this Complaint goes to an ALJ hearing, we can expect the ALJ to carefully evaluate the context in which the policy was enacted and enforced. Right now, we do not know any of the other provisions in the AMR policy, but the provisions cited by the regional office generally prohibiting disparaging comments and requiring approval for any posts of any kind regarding AMR have the potential by themselves to discourage concerted or union activity.  In addition, the NLRB’s press release also suggests that the employee was terminated after she was denied union representation at a disciplinary meeting. 

The NLRB’s press release and its recent embracing of social media for its own communications – I obtained the press release from an NLRB “tweet” – suggests that social media may be  becoming a point of emphasis for the Board.  Regardless of whether they are unionized or not, employers should be reviewing their social media policies to ensure that any restrictions on communications about the Company are tailored to things that the company can legitimately restrict, like violations of the company harassment policy, or disclosure of confidential or trade secret information.  But those restrictions should not be so broad as to prohibit all employee discussion of the company on their social media pages because the NLRB will likely consider that overbroad and a violation of Section 7 rights.

NLRB Seeks Remand of All 96 Decisions Pending in Before Federal Courts of Appeals and US Supreme Court

As an update to my June 30 post regarding New Process Steel v. NLRB, the NLRB has sought to remand all 96 decisions currently pending in the federal courts of appeals and on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The NLRB requested to have each of these 96 decisions reconsidered by a three-member panel, which would include Chairman Wilma Liebman and member Peter Schaumber who issued the decisions originally when the NLRB had only two members. It is undetermined what will happen to the remaining decisions that are not pending appeal in the federal courts (over 500) issued while the NLRB had only two members.

 

U.S. Supreme Court Holds NLRB Had No Authority To Issue Decisions from January 2008 to March 2010

As an update to my earlier blog postings (Supreme Court Agrees to Consider Legality of Two-Member NLRB Rulings, Second Circuit Agrees with First and Seventh Circuits that the Two-Member NLRB Had Authority to Issue Opinions, and Two Conflicting Federal Circuit Court Decisions Issued Today Call Into Question all NLRB Opinions Issued in the Past Year), last Thursday, the Supreme Court settled the issue of whether the two-member National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that existed from January 1, 2008 to March 26, 2010 had the authority to issue binding opinions. 

In a surprise 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the two member panel NLRB did not have authority to issue opinions—a decision that affects nearly 600 opinions issued during a two-year period of time. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, wrote the opinion for the Court. Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor dissented.

Recall that, prior to this decision, there was a split between the federal courts of appeals regarding whether the two-member NLRB had authority to issue opinions. The First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits had previously held that it had the authority, while the D.C. Circuit held that it did not.

 

By way of background, the NLRB is a federal agency that administers the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which governs the relations between private employers and unions. It is made up of five members. Yet, the NLRA allows for the five-member Board to delegate power to issue rulings and opinions to a three-member panel. On December 28, 2007, the Board, which had only four members at the time, voted to delegate all of its power to a three-member panel. Three days later, the terms of two of the four members that made the vote to delegate expired, leaving only two members. During all of 2008, 2009, and early 2010, the Board had three vacancies while Congress and the President clashed on the nomination of replacement Board members. On March 27, 2010, President Obama made two recess appointments to the NLRB, bringing its numbers back up to four members. By then, the two-member panel had issued nearly 600 decisions, acting as a quorum of the three-member panel. The Supreme Court held that the two-member NLRB, lacked the authority to issue those decisions. 

 

The Impact of this Decision

This decision has a widespread impact on labor relations law. Every decision issued by the NLRB from January 1, 2008 to March 26, 2010—nearly 600 decisions—was issued by an NLRB without the authority to do so. It is likely that the decisions that were challenged in the federal court system will be vacated since the Court held that the Board lacked the authority to issue them. This means that all of those decisions will have to be reheard by the NLRB, which now has a sufficient number of members to issue opinions. 

 

As for those decisions not challenged, it is less clear. There may be an argument that the parties waived the right to challenge them as invalid by not appealing or that the judgments are final and cannot be reopened. Yet, the defect in these decisions goes to the power of the Board to issue the decisions, and thus, it may not be possible to waive.

 

The precedential effect of these decisions is similarly unclear. The current NLRB could issue an order accepting all of them as valid precedent (provided they have the authority to do that, something that is not clear), or the decisions could simply have no precedential effect at all and be reexamined as the issues arise in new cases. Regardless, the fall-out from this decision is likely to be significant and may be largely unsettled for much of 2010.

President Obama Bypasses Senate and Appoints Democrats Becker and Pearce to Serve on the NLRB

In a much anticipated and controversial move, President Obama announced on March 27, 2010 that he will appoint Democrats Craig Becker and Mark Pearce as members of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). 

Becker, Pearce, and a third candidate, Republican Brian Hayes, were first nominated by Obama to fill the three vacant positions on the five-member NLRB in July 2009. However, the nominations stalled in the Senate, primarily due to Republican concerns over the nomination of Becker. Becker has been an in-house attorney for the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) since 1990, an AFL-CIO staff counsel since 2004, and is a law professor. In a letter written last week, all 41 Republican senators urged Obama not to issue a recess appointment for Becker because his past work as legal counsel for the SEIU and AFL-CIO “indicate(s) that he could not be viewed as impartial, unbiased, or objective.” Similarly, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce issued a statement calling Becker’s appointment a “special interest payback” for unions, and warned “the business community should be on red alert for radical changes that could significantly impair the ability of America’s job creators to complete.”

Pearce, the other recess appointment to the NLRB, is a founding partner of Creighton, Pearce, Johnson & Giroux, a labor-side labor and employment law firm in Buffalo, NY.

Obama justified the recess appointments of Becker and Pearce in an announcement stating that the Senate has “the responsibility to approve or disapprove of my nominees. But if, in the interest of scoring political points, Republicans in the Senate refuse to exercise that responsibility, I must act in the interest of the American people and exercise my authority to fill these positions on an interim basis.”

Becker’s and Pearce’s recess appointments will last until the end of the 2011 congressional term. They will join the two existing NLRB members, Chair Wilma B. Liebman (Democrat) and Peter Schaumberg (Republican). The fifth NLRB position, which is slated to be filled by a Republican, remains unfilled.

Now that the Democrat appointees hold a 3-to-1 majority on the NLRB, employers should be on guard for some radical, pro-union changes in decisions handed down by the NLRB, which historically has had little regard for the precedential value of its earlier decisions.

D.C. Circuit Overturns Portion of NLRB Register-Guard Decision

Back in December 2007, we wrote about the NLRB's decision in The Guard Publishing Company, d/b/a The Register-Guard, 351 NLRB No. 70, which held that employees do not have a protected right to use employer email systems for solicitations or communications regarding union-related topics. In addition, the Board applied a new standard for determining when employers discriminatorily enforce email policies and, thus, violate Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Specifically, as to the 8(a)(3) standard, the Board held that, in determining whether a policy had been discriminatorily enforced against the union, it looked to whether there had been "unequal treatment of equals."  Then, the Board upheld Register-Guard's enforcement of its email policy against an employee who was soliciting support for the union because there was no evidence that the company had permitted solicitation on behalf of other non-union groups (even though it had permitted various other personal uses of the email system, including personal solicitations for sports tickets and the like.) 

On July 7, 2009, however, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit refused to uphold the Board's conclusion as to whether the employer discriminatorily enforced its email policy but did not explicitly overrule the standard announced by the Board in December.   (On appeal, the union did not challenge the lawfulness of the email policy itself).   In short, the court held that the the company's discipline of an employee for using the email system to solicit employees to wear green in support of the union and to seek volunteers to help with the union's entry in a city parade violated 8(a)(3). Calling the distinction between organizational and personal solicitation a "post-hoc invention" that did not actually exist in the company's email policy, the court found that the company policy prohibiting non-work-related solicitations "made no distinction between solicitations for groups and for individuals."  Equally significant, the court noted that the company’s disciplinary warning" did not invoke the organization-versus-individual line drawn by the Board. To the contrary, the company told the employee in question to “refrain from using the Company’s systems for union/personal business.”

Because it is so fact-specific, the court's decision should not cause employers much concern.   In fact, the email policy at issue, which prohibited use of the company's communications systems “to solicit or proselytize for commercial ventures, religious or political causes, outside organizations, or other non-job-related solicitations,” would seem to be equally applicable to personal solicitations of a non-work nature as it is to organizational solicitations.   The good news here is that the court's decision does not disturb the underlying premise that employers may prohibit union access to its email system so long as it does so in a nondiscriminatory manner.  

Second Circuit Agrees with First and Seventh Circuits that the Two-Member NLRB Had Authority to Issue Opinions

As we reported earlier, there is a split in the federal courts of appeals regarding whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has authority to issue binding opinions while it is operating with only two members. Since that post, another federal circuit has weighed in on the issue.

 

The NLRB is the federal agency charged with governing relations between private employers and unions and administering the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Ordinarily, the NLRB has five members and frequently delegates power to issue rulings and opinions to three-member panels. In order for the NLRB itself to act, it must have a three-member quorum. In late December 2007, the NLRB had one vacancy and two members whose terms were nearing expiration. Congress and the President clashed on the nomination of replacement NLRB members, and filling the vacancies became unlikely (and still has not occurred). Just before the expiration of the two members’ terms, the four-member NLRB delegated all of its power to a three-member panel, which included the two members whose terms were not set to expire. After the two departing members’ terms expired, the two remaining members of the three-member panel continued to issue opinions, relying on statutory language in the NLRA allowing a three-member panel to proceed as a quorum in the absence of one of its members. 

During this period of time and to the date of this post, the two-member quorum of the panel has issued more than 400 opinions. Those opinions were challenged in several federal court actions arguing that, in order for two members of a three-member panel to proceed as a quorum, the NLRB itself must have a quorum of three members; otherwise, the NLRB and the panel lack authority to act. The First and Seventh Circuits held that the two-member panel had authority to issue opinions. The D.C. Circuit, however, held that it did not. 

 

In Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, No. 08-3822 (2d Cir. June 17, 2009), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit joined the First and Seventh Circuits on this issue holding that the two remaining members of the panel did have authority to issue binding opinions. It reached this result by relying on slightly different reasoning from that of the First and Seventh Circuits. Those courts relied primarily on the unambiguous plain text of the statute. The Second Circuit, instead, held that the plain text was ambiguous and deferred to the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA. The Court deferred to the NLRB’s interpretation under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which requires deference to agency statutory interpretation,because the NLRB is the agency charged with administering the NLRA, and the court found the NLRB’s interpretation reasonable.

 

On May 27, 2009, the NLRB filed a petition with the D.C. Circuit for re-hearing by the entire D.C. Circuit (en banc) of the decision holding that the NLRB lacked authority.

Given the split in authority and the potential impact on the more than 400 NLRB decisions issued in 2008 and 2009, it is likely that the United States Supreme Court will weigh in on this issue. Unless and until that happens, employers should proceed with caution when relying on NLRB decisions issued after December 31, 2007 by this two-member quorum.

Two Conflicting Federal Circuit Court Decisions Issued Today Call Into Question all NLRB Opinions Issued in the Past Year

 As a result of two contradictory opinions issued today, over 300 decisions issued by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “Board”) in 2008 are potentially in jeopardy because, according to one federal circuit, they were issued by a two-member panel without the authority to issue binding opinions. 

By way of background, the NLRB is a federal agency that administers the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which governs the relations between private employers and unions. It is made up of five members. Yet, the NLRA allows for the five-member Board to delegate power to issue rulings and opinions to a three-member panel. On December 28, 2007, the Board had only four members. On that date, the four-member Board voted to delegate all of its power to a three-member panel. Just three days later, the terms of two of the four members that made the vote to delegate expired, leaving only two remaining members. During all of 2008 and early 2009, the Board had three vacancies for which Congress and the President clashed on the nomination of replacement Board members. Yet the two-member panel issued over 300 published and unpublished opinions in the labor relations area, proceeding as a quorum of the three-member panel—with two of the three required members of the three-member panel to whom the Board delegated its power.

 

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled today that those decisions were invalid because the Board, including the panel to whom it delegated its power, lacked authority to act without at least three members. Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 08-1162, 08-1214 (D.C. Cir. May 1, 2009).  In reaching this conclusion, the D.C. Circuit relied on a provision of the NLRA requiring the Board to have a quorum of the Board itself (i.e. three members) “at all times” in order to be able to act. The D.C. Circuit held that, in order for two members of a three-member panel to act as a quorum under the statute, the Board itself must have at least three members; otherwise, the panel’s power is suspended along with the power of the Board itself. This decision invalidated all of the NLRB opinions issued in 2008 and early 2009.

 

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in another decision issued today, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, Nos. 08-3517, 08-3518, 08-3709 & 08-3859 (7th Cir. May 1, 2009). It held that the opinions of the two remaining members were valid because the plain meaning of the statute permits the Board to delegate power to a three-member panel and then also permits a three-member panel to proceed as a quorum despite the absence of one of the members. The Seventh Circuit ignored the quorum requirement provision for the Board itself in its reasoning. 

 

The First Circuit also reached this same conclusion in March 2009. See Northeastern Land Servs. Ltd. d/b/a NLS Group v. NLRB, No. 08-1878 (1st Cir. Mar. 13, 2009). The Second and Eighth Circuits also have pending cases on this same issue. Given the split in authority and the potential impact of these decisions, it is likely that the U.S. Supreme will weigh in on this issue. In the meantime, employers should proceed with caution in relying on NLRB opinions issued in 2008 and early 2009 in taking actions.

Reminder to Unionized Businesses: You May Have a Duty to Bargain With Union Over Layoff Decisions

The recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Pan American Grain Co. v. NLRB serves as a good reminder for unionized businesses contemplating layoffs: They may be obligated to bargain with the union that represents their employees not only over the effects of the layoff on employees but, possibly, the decision itself.

In Pan American, the court affirmed the NLRB’s ruling that a Puerto Rico grain company violated federal labor law by laying off 15 striking workers in February 2002 without giving their union an opportunity to bargain over the decision. Approximately 40 employees had been on strike for about two months when the employer announced that 15 of the striking employees would laid off “due to economic reasons and as a result of a substantial decrease in production and sales.” During the unfair labor practice proceedings that ensued following the union’s unfair labor practice charge filing, the employer claimed that the layoffs were prompted due to a combination of its efforts to modernize its operations and reduced sales. The NLRB ruled, and the court agreed, that in situations where there are multiple motives for a layoff, the employer has a duty to bargain with the union over the layoff decision as long as it is based at least partially on labor costs.

As a remedy for the employer’s violation of its duty to bargain, the NLRB ruled that the employer was liable for full back pay to the 15 employees who had been laid off. Pan American argued to the court that full back pay to the 15 employees dating back to 2002 would constitute an undue burden on the company and noted that it had not increased its workforce since the February 2002 layoffs. On review, the court stated that the employer should be allowed to introduce evidence to the NLRB at the compliance proceedings to show that the reinstatement and full back pay of the 15 employees would be unduly burdensome.

The Pan American case serves as a potentially very expensive lesson for one employer that, even in these economically-troubling times, no unionized business can afford to overlook the possibility that it may be required under federal labor law to bargain with a union over the decision to layoff employees. The decision makes clear that the duty to bargain over a layoff decision exists even if labor cost savings are only one factor among many. An employer can satisfy its decision-bargaining obligation by giving the union timely notice that a layoff decision is being contemplated. If the union asks for more information about the factors behind the decision and/or to bargain over the decision, the employer may be obligated to provide the information and/or to bargain with the union over the decision before the employer becomes irrevocably committed to implementing the layoff. Decision bargaining could include being willing to consider alternatives proposed by the union to achieve the desired cost savings. Decision bargaining does not require that the employer and union reach agreement. However, at a minimum, the employer and union must have bargained to a bona fide, good faith impasse before the employer can implement its decision.

 

All unionized businesses should also keep in mind that they have a duty to bargain with a union over the effects of a layoff. Effects bargaining might include the number and order of layoffs, severance pay, health insurance, bumping rights, preferential hiring at other facilities, and job search assistance, among other things. In some instances, some or all effects bargaining issues are already addressed in the collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a union.

Tough economic times sometimes call for difficult workforce decisions. Employers should be careful not to make a bad situation worse by risking unfair labor practice liability.