Employers facing workplace discrimination claims in the 6th Circuit should find some comfort in the court’s recent decision in DeBra v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., which endorses a heightened standard for plaintiffs to demonstrate that they were treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside their protected class.

The plaintiff worked as a bank teller for Chase until she was terminated for on-the-job errors, such as overpaying customers, leaving bank funds unsecured on counters and accidentally failing to return bank cards to several customers. She alleged, however, that the bank’s reliance on these errors for her termination was really a pretext for age discrimination because other, younger tellers committed the same errors yet were retained.Continue Reading Sixth Circuit decision shows similarly situated employees must truly be similarly situated in discrimination cases

Agreeing with the district court’s assessment that “résumé misrepresentations by a senior human resources professional represent an infraction so egregious as to defy correction by mere counseling or other lesser discipline,” the 6th Circuit on April 23, 2018, rejected an appeal from a summary judgment order on claims of pregnancy, race, and age discrimination and retaliation in Bailey v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc..

Michelle Bailey, a 40 year old African-American woman, was fired from her position as a senior staffing professional at Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. (Oakwood) on the day she returned from a three-month maternity leave. During her maternity leave, her supervisor had identified deficiencies in her work performance that prompted the supervisor to go back and review her qualifications. When she checked, she found what Ms. Bailey acknowledged in deposition were “embellishments” on her employment application. In notifying Ms. Bailey of her termination, Oakwood relied on both the deficiencies and the misrepresentations. Ms. Bailey later sued, claiming that she was fired because of her pregnancy, her race and her age as well as in retaliation for concerns she had expressed about the rejection of employment applications of certain African-American candidates for employment at Oakwood prior to her maternity leave. The district court granted summary judgment in Oakwood’s favor on each of these counts.
Continue Reading Sixth Circuit upholds termination of human resources employee for employment application misrepresentations and performance deficiencies

Never underestimate the power of a pro se litigant. That’s one lesson to take away from the Seventh Circuit’s en banc opinion in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, which is the first appellate decision to hold that Title VII bars employment discrimination on the basis of a person’s sexual orientation. Because Ivy Tech has stated that it does not plan to seek Supreme Court review (despite a Circuit split on the issue), employers subject to Title VII, particularly in Illinois, Wisconsin and Indiana, should know about this opinion and consider how and whether it may apply to them.

Surprisingly, this momentous decision resulted not from a national impact-litigation strategy but rather from the humble efforts of one pro se litigant. Math teacher Kimberly Hively filed a form complaint in federal court that alleged she was denied full-time teaching positions and promotions based on her sexual orientation, and sought damages based on Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Ivy Tech Community College moved to dismiss and the Northern District of Indiana granted the motion. Undeterred, Ms. Hively retained advocacy group Lambda Legal to prosecute an appeal. Although she initially lost in a now-vacated opinion filed by a Seventh Circuit panel, Ms. Hively successfully sought reconsideration by the en banc Seventh Circuit with the support of amici EEOC and five Members of Congress, among others. The full Court voted 8-3 in favor of Ms. Hively and issued four opinions.Continue Reading Pro se litigant sets off Title VII avalanche: Seventh Circuit holds that Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination

On Nov. 21, 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued its new and updated Enforcement Guidance on National Origin Discrimination, replacing its 2002 guidance on the subject.

In the guidance, the EEOC defines national origin discrimination as “discrimination because an individual (or his or her ancestors) is from a certain place or has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a particular national origin group.” This includes discrimination because of an individual’s “place of origin” such as a country, a former country (e.g., Yugoslavia) or a geographic region closely associated with a particular national origin group (e.g., Kurdistan). Further, a “national origin” or “ethnic” group is a “group of people sharing a common language, culture, ancestry, race and or other social characteristics,” such as “Hispanics, Arabs or Roma.”

Under the guidance, discrimination includes treating persons less favorably because they do not belong to a particular ethnic group, as well as because they do. Employees are also protected from discrimination because they associate with someone of a particular national origin (e.g., by marriage). The EEOC also takes the position that national origin discrimination can be based on an individual’s “perceived” status as a member of an ethnic group. However, as we explained in a recent blog based on the Longoria decision in the Northern District of Ohio federal court, few courts (including none in Ohio) have recognized such a theory of liability.
Continue Reading EEOC issues new guidance on national origin discrimination

A special thanks to Adam Bennett for his assistance with this article.

An Ohio federal court in Longoria v. Autoneum N. Am., Inc. has held that a Mexican-American production supervisor who was born in Texas could not pursue a claim that he was discriminated against based on his belief that his employer perceived him to be of Mexican national origin. Noting the “widespread failure” of similar claims under Title VII and the fact that Ohio courts generally follow Title VII when evaluating the analogous Ohio law, the court held that claims of perceived national origin discrimination are not cognizable under Ohio law. The court also rejected Longoria’s claims of race discrimination and retaliation on the merits.
Continue Reading Ohio federal court rejects perceived national origin discrimination claim

As we reported last year, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) planned to issue a Final Rule updating its sex discrimination regulations for federal contractors and subcontractors for the first time since the 1970s. In doing so, sex discrimination prohibitions for federal contractors have been modernized to include discrimination on the bases of sex, pregnancy, childbirth, pregnancy-related medical conditions, gender identity, transgender status and sex stereotyping. Notably, sexual orientation was excluded from the definition.

The Final Rule amends regulations implementing Executive Order 11246, which prohibits discrimination by federal contractors on sever bases, including sex. The Final Rule applies only to companies that are contractors and subcontractors of a covered federal contract (totaling $10,000 or more over a 12-month period). The Final Rule includes mandatory provisions targeted at prohibiting modern issues of sex discrimination, as well as some advisory “best practices.”
Continue Reading OFCCP publishes final rules on sex discrimination for federal contractors

Earlier this week, the EEOC issued new guidance addressing what it described as common issues it continues to see in discrimination charges filed under the Americans with Disabilities Act. This new guidance provides nothing new that has not already been included in its Revised Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, but does highlight, among other issues, the EEOC’s view that the ADA requires employers to:
Continue Reading EEOC issues new guidance on employer-provided leaves as a reasonable accommodation

Employers who have been concerned about the EEOC’s stance on inflexible maximum leave policies can find some comfort in the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hwang v. Kansas State University, wherein the court held a six month leave of absence was a reasonable accommodation, and the University’s denial of additional time was not a violation of the Rehabilitation Act.

Facts

Grace Hwang was employed as a professor at Kansas State University from 1994 until February 2012, on a year-to-year contract. Ms. Hwang served as an assistant professor in KSU’s School of Leadership Studies. In 2005, Hwang was diagnosed with breast cancer. She underwent surgery, chemotherapy and radiation and missed about three weeks of work. Hwang returned to her full load of classes for four years until she was diagnosed with leukemia. Hwang was encouraged to participate in an aggressive course of chemotherapy and to have a bone marrow transplant, which would keep her away from work for about six months. At that time, Hwang had only two months of paid leave time, so she applied for and received additional paid leave through KSU’s Shared Leave Program.

Hwang was released from the inpatient care facility in November 2009. However, at the time of her release, KSU was dealing with a severe outbreak of the H1N1 virus. Hwang’s physicians advised she stay away from campus due to her compromised immune system. Hwang contacted Dr. Mary Tolar, her supervisor, to let her know that she would need to take additional leave through the spring semester. Hwang stated, however, that she planned to teach her online course during the summer.Continue Reading University gets it right when it says, “enough is enough”: Tenth Circuit upholds inflexible leave policy under Rehabilitation Act

In an employment race discrimination case, a federal court recently held that the defendant-employer did not have “possession, custody, or control” over text messages sent or received by its employees on their personal cell phones. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel the production of these text messages because there was no evidence that:

– the employer issued the cell phones to the employees;
– the employees used the cell phones for any work-related purpose; or
– the employer otherwise had any legal right to obtain employee text messages on demand.
Continue Reading Court Holds That Employer Did Not Have “Possession, Custody or Control” of Text Messages Sent or Received on its Employees’ Personal Cell Phones