The Supreme Court recently clarified the meaning of “changing clothes” under Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act in Sandifer v. United States Steel. In general, non-exempt employees who spend time “donning” (putting on) and “doffing” (taking off) certain articles of clothing associated with their job must be compensated for that time. Section 203(o) provides an exception to this requirement in the context of collective bargaining—if an employer and the employees’ union agree that employees will not be paid for time spent “changing clothes,” the employer does not have to compensate for that time.
Continue Reading Supreme Court interprets meaning of “changing clothes” under FLSA collective bargaining exception

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit revived the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)’s lawsuit against Skanska USA Building, Inc., holding that it was the de facto employer for subcontracted employees, a decision with potentially broad-reaching implications for employers with subcontracted employees and independent contractors, particularly in the construction industry.
Continue Reading Sixth Circuit Holds that Subcontracted Employees Can Sue the General Contractor on Construction Project as Their De Facto Employer

Come Jan. 1, 2014, the federal minimum wage rate will remain at $7.25 per hour for non-tipped employees, and $2.13 per hour for tipped employees. As of Jan. 1, 2013, 19 states and the District of Columbia had minimum wage rates higher than the federal minimum wage rate. In 2014, not only will that number grow to 20 states, but a number will see their minimum wage rates increase further.
Continue Reading State Minimum Wage Increases for 2014

Stewart v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:11-cv-0342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16035 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2013) serves as a cautionary tale to employers about the disastrous impact that can happen when managers and social media collide. And while this case turned out well for the employer in the end, that end was

The Sixth Circuit held that a six-month time limitation in an employment agreement constitutes an invalid waiver of an employee’s claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and, more surprisingly, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”).

In Boaz v. FedEx Customer Information Services, Inc. No. 12-5319 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2013), the plaintiff, Margaret

A federal court has denied a defendant-employer’s request that plaintiffs sift through and turn over all their social media posts made during their work hours in an FLSA collective action in which the plaintiffs claim their employer failed to give them meal breaks. How did that happen? I thought you’d never ask.
Continue Reading Court Denies Employer’s Access to Social Media Posts in FLSA Collective Action and Sends Warning: If You Want Access to Social Media, Come with Both Barrels Loaded … Leave the Water Gun at Home

By a tight five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court’s Genesis Health Care Corp. v. Symczyk decision provides employers a method to “pick off” the lead plaintiff in an FLSA collective action using a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of judgment and by doing so, take out the remaining collective action.
Continue Reading Genesis: A Unicorn, or the Beginning of a New Tactic? Supreme Court Holds Employers Can “Pick Off” a Named Plaintiff and Defeat a FLSA Collective Action with an offer of Judgment, but Leaves Open If All Employers Can Employ This Strategy

The Northern District of Ohio is the latest in a long line of courts to send the following message to nationwide collective class plaintiffs: Stop seeking nationwide class certification where the plaintiffs are spread across facilities and have too many factual differences to be "similarly situated" and to have experienced a common injury under the

We have kept you up to speed on Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Productions, L.L.C., here and then here, a Fifth Circuit case in which the Fifth Circuit approved a private settlement of employees’ claims for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). More specifically, the court held that parties could privately