Much has been written recently about the first 100 days of the Trump Administration. Some would argue that little of significance has changed in the employment regulation world. But, the confirmation on April 27, 2017 of new Secretary of Labor R. Alexander Acosta squeaked through the door just before the first 100 days concluded and it could be an initial step towards the sort of employment regulation reform that many in the business community have been expecting.

Secretary Acosta will lead the Department of Labor (DOL), the cabinet department responsible for, among other agencies, the federal Wage and Hour Division (WHD), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). The WHD regulates minimum wage and overtime compliance, including the related exemptions and FMLA compliance. Of course OSHA regulates workplace safety and the OFCCP enforces affirmative action requirements for federal contractors and subcontractors. Clearly, Secretary Acosta will have an opportunity to impact significant areas of employment regulation, though the specific impact remains to be seen. The new Secretary’s early public remarks understandably have been general and focused on broadly-stated objectives to preserve and return jobs. But will the path to that aim include significant changes in existing and proposed employment regulations?
Continue Reading New Secretary of Labor sworn in

A divided Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio’s minimum wage law exempts employees engaged in an executive, administrative or professional capacity, or as outside salespersons, summer camp employees, fishing employees, small publication employees and family farm employees. In Haight v. Minchak, No. 2016-Ohio-1053, two sales representatives challenged the constitutionality of Ohio’s minimum wage statute (R.C. 4111.14)—arguing that the definition of employee in R.C. 4111.14(B)(1) conflicts with the definition in the Ohio Constitution. The Court held that the definitions did not conflict.

John Haight and Christopher Pence were sales representatives for Cheap Escape Company. They were paid by commissions plus a draw. The Company stopped paying or reduced the draw when its sales representatives underperformed. The compensation the underperforming sales representatives received fell below Ohio’s minimum wage. Haight and Pence filed a class action lawsuit alleging that R.C. 4111.14 was unconstitutional and seeking unpaid wages.
Continue Reading Minimum wage exemptions upheld in Ohio Supreme Court case

It is not news that class action lawsuits for unpaid overtime are on the rise. A settlement agreement approved recently by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio shows just how costly those claims can be.

In Thorn v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc. the U.S. District Court in Columbus, Ohio approved a settlement between Bob Evans Farms, Inc. (BEF) and a class of 1,566 current and former assistant restaurant managers. The assistant managers had been treated by BEF as exempt from overtime requirements under federal and state law. In the class action lawsuit, the assistant managers argued that they had performed non-exempt duties, including operating cash registers, food preparation and clean-up to such an extent that they were not genuinely exempt from overtime pay requirements.
Continue Reading Assistant managers’ wage hour battle with Bob Evans Farms settled for $16.5 million

The Supreme Court recently clarified the meaning of “changing clothes” under Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act in Sandifer v. United States Steel. In general, non-exempt employees who spend time “donning” (putting on) and “doffing” (taking off) certain articles of clothing associated with their job must be compensated for that time. Section 203(o) provides an exception to this requirement in the context of collective bargaining—if an employer and the employees’ union agree that employees will not be paid for time spent “changing clothes,” the employer does not have to compensate for that time.
Continue Reading Supreme Court interprets meaning of “changing clothes” under FLSA collective bargaining exception

Stewart v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:11-cv-0342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16035 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2013) serves as a cautionary tale to employers about the disastrous impact that can happen when managers and social media collide. And while this case turned out well for the employer in the end, that end was

The Sixth Circuit held that a six-month time limitation in an employment agreement constitutes an invalid waiver of an employee’s claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and, more surprisingly, the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”).

In Boaz v. FedEx Customer Information Services, Inc. No. 12-5319 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2013), the plaintiff, Margaret

A federal court has denied a defendant-employer’s request that plaintiffs sift through and turn over all their social media posts made during their work hours in an FLSA collective action in which the plaintiffs claim their employer failed to give them meal breaks. How did that happen? I thought you’d never ask.
Continue Reading Court Denies Employer’s Access to Social Media Posts in FLSA Collective Action and Sends Warning: If You Want Access to Social Media, Come with Both Barrels Loaded … Leave the Water Gun at Home

By a tight five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court’s Genesis Health Care Corp. v. Symczyk decision provides employers a method to “pick off” the lead plaintiff in an FLSA collective action using a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of judgment and by doing so, take out the remaining collective action.
Continue Reading Genesis: A Unicorn, or the Beginning of a New Tactic? Supreme Court Holds Employers Can “Pick Off” a Named Plaintiff and Defeat a FLSA Collective Action with an offer of Judgment, but Leaves Open If All Employers Can Employ This Strategy

The Northern District of Ohio is the latest in a long line of courts to send the following message to nationwide collective class plaintiffs: Stop seeking nationwide class certification where the plaintiffs are spread across facilities and have too many factual differences to be "similarly situated" and to have experienced a common injury under the